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Territorial autonomy is a significant alternative of conflict resolution methods. 
This territorial autonomy arrangement, which could be realized even outside federal 
system of governance, is a compromise between a region or minority aiming at self-
determination and a state protecting its sovereignty. Territorial autonomy is 
increasingly advocated as a solution to intra-state conflicts by academicians, political 
theorists and policy makers, while being a solution to many conflicts, there is reason 
to suspect that autonomy can, under certain circumstances, act as a catalyst of conflict. 
This is quite evident in the Indian context, where the erosion of Kashmir Autonomy 
further complicated the already existing bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan. 
Erosion also proved a prominent source of conflict between Jammu and Kashmir with 
the Union of India.
Many theorists have found that solutions involving regional autonomy are 
effective in dealing with ethnic conflicts. Ted Gurr, for example, has argued that 
“negotiated regional autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethno-
political wars of secession in Western and Third World States.”1Similarly, Kjell-
ÅkeNordquist has observed that creating autonomy—“a self-governing intra-state 
region—as a conflict-solving mechanism in an internal armed conflict is both a 
theoretical and, very often, a practical option for the parties in such conflicts.2
However, Central governments are almost universally reluctant to accede to 
demands for autonomy for several reasons. First and foremost, they fear that granting 
territorial autonomy to a minority group would be merely the first step toward the 
eventual secession of the region. Second, granting autonomy to one region may be 
                                               
1Gurr, Ted Robert. "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." 
International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994): 366-377.
2Nordquist, Kjell-Ake. "Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism: An Overview." In Autonomy: 
Applications and Implications, by Markku Suksi, 59. Hague, 1998.
2perceived as discrimination against other inhabitants or groups. Third, autonomy 
increases the risk of intervention by a foreign state affiliated with the specific minority 
population. Nevertheless, in spite of such reservations an increasing number of ethno-
political conflicts over territory have been settled by compromises involving regional 
autonomy, such as the provision to Miskitosof Nicaragua in 1987 and the Gagauzof 
Moldova in 1994. The popularity of autonomy as a solution undoubtedly stems from 
its being one of the few conceivable compromise solutions in conflicts over the 
administrative control of a specific territory. Indeed autonomy represents a 
compromise on the issue of state sovereignty itself. Autonomy indeed appeared to be a 
very flexible political tool which can be used in order to pacify the concerns of 
minorities within a State. In other words, autonomy is a stabilizing tool which is a 
better compromise for parties concerned, even though their aims might be quite far 
away from that solution.
There is a vast literature on the topic of concept of territorial autonomy and 
autonomy in general which is commonly perceived as a useful tool for 
accommodation of sub-state nations. Many authors, in their works, focus on positive 
impacts that autonomy has, for instance easing of ethnic tensions, prevention of 
secession or preservation of unity within a state and complexity of its application like 
proper negotiations, territorial limitations etc.Will Kymlicka, an eminent theorist, has 
developed in his work a liberal opinion which is very supportive towards 
accommodation of minorities within what he calls multi-nation federalism which 
recognizes cultural diversity of the country by creating territorial units. Such 
accommodation implies certain limitations of state sovereignty and basically giving 
minority many powers to express and diffuse its language and culture at the sub-state 
level that majority groups exercises through the central state.3
On the other hand, another authority on the subject, Hurst Hannum is very
careful with usage of the concept of territorial autonomy and stresses, “it is indeed one 
of the tools which remain useful, but only if it is clear for which purposes it has been 
used. And more importantly, it can be successful only if it is based on strong 
                                               
3Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity.
Oxford University Press, 2007.
3willingness of people to live together.” He is of the opinion that the best advantage of 
autonomy as a solution to ethnic conflicts is its flexibility. Autonomy encompasses a 
wide range of constitutional relationships including separated legislature, judiciary 
and financial independent authority or powers over language, education or culture. It 
is also perceived as a successful response to concerns about minority rights and as an 
instrument which maintains the territorial integrity of existing state, since autonomous 
units are not becoming sovereign. In this way, autonomy is based on contributing 
both, majority concerns and minority demands.4 Yet Ruth Lapidoth, another 
international expert on autonomy indicates flexibility of autonomous arrangements or 
rather at the necessity to establish them in the way that allows their modification in 
future. Lapidoth points at its proper usage and warns about future difficulties, usually 
regarding different opinions of actors on devolution of power or clashes between 
them. For this reason arrangements of autonomy should not be rigid, but rather 
flexible which allows introduction of changes in future.5 While as Stefan Wolff says 
that the biggest advantage of territorial autonomy is that this concept is the only one 
among territorial claims, which does not aim to change internationally recognized 
boundaries, but express desire of a particular ethnic group to gain some form of self-
governance within its homeland. In some cases, autonomy is, however, not desired it 
is rather the second best option either when the particular ethnic group notices that the 
recognition of their separated statehood is unlikely to happen or when their ability to 
survive as an independent state would be contained. Because of its non-disturbing 
impact on existing states, the international community has been long defender of this 
accommodation, since autonomy provides for a viable compromise between states and 
minorities.6
Thus, it is quite clear that the question of autonomy has gained a lot of 
significance in the methodology of conflict resolution in the contemporary times. 
                                               
4 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, Philadelphia: University, Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pp. 1-3
5Lapidoth, Ruth. Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts . Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
6Wolff, Stefan. Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
4Therefore, the study of various models of autonomy has become subject matter of the 
Political Science, International Relations and Peace Studies. The problem is 
significantly related to the present study as both the case studies; Kashmir issue and 
Aland Islands Autonomy model undertaken for comparison have autonomy as a 
common factor. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the model of autonomy and its 
working has been similar in both the situations. We are proceeding with an 
assumption that in the context of Aland, autonomy evolved from 1920’s, has worked 
successfully because of which  ceased to be a problem. While as in the case of 
Kashmir, autonomy as provided under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was 
substantially eroded, consequently Kashmir continues to be an issue. Thus, many 
political forces in Kashmir including one of the mainstream political party ‘Jammu 
and Kashmir National Conference’ suggested that in order to address the Kashmir 
issue the autonomy need to be restored in its pristine form. Besides, over the years, 
Indian State has been facing enormous challenges at different levels. There are 
different regional forces striving for the transformation of Indian quasi-federal 
structure into a genuine federal system in which regional parties have a say vis-à-vis 
their domestic policies, politics and administration are concerned. In the light of these 
developments, the current study proposed to look in the various insights that can be 
drawn and will have relevance for the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Autonomy, in the framework of a modern democratic state, was first 
established in 1921 in Finland‘s Aland Islands. Later, such concept of power sharing 
has been implemented in all the continents, and in 2009 it was operational in at least 
60 different regions in 20 different States.7 Particularly, after World War II, the idea 
of autonomy for the protection of ethnic or national minorities and the resolution of 
self-determination conflicts became a political reality in various European States and 
as well as in Asia. In most cases, regional autonomy provided the legal-political 
framework for the internal self-determination of smaller or indigenous people or of an 
ethnic minority, preserving a specific ethno-cultural identity while maintaining the 
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5sovereignty of the state in which they live. Not only could autonomy bring about 
peace and stability in conflict-ridden societies, but it could also enhance new 
partnerships between the centre and the regional community. 
The problem of Kashmir as it emerged shortly after independence of India was 
in many ways a by product of political complexity that the subcontinent had 
undergone during the colonial period which climaxed in its division. The partition of 
Indian Sub-continent was the most violent event in the recorded history of India. The 
legacy left indelible marks of violence and simmering flames in Kashmir. With the 
lapse of British paramountcy, Princely states including the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir were asked to choose between the two dominions; India and Pakistan. 
Several factors were responsible in complicating the context in Kashmir.  One, that 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir in its geo-ethnic structure was heterogeneous and 
diverse with divergent political orientations and aspirations, Secondly the situation, in 
which partition took place created political uncertainty within and outside the state. 
The Maharaja Hari Singh found it difficult to decide in favour of either side. During 
the crucialyears proceeding 1947 there were different types of forces within the state 
operating for divergent political ends. There were forces active for Kashmir’s 
accession to Pakistan and forces that wanted Kashmir to accede to India.8 In addition, 
there has always been strong opinion in favour of Kashmir remaining independent. 
However, none of the forces had an easy choice because of various checks and 
balances operating from within and outside.9
Maharaja Hari Singh, Dogra ruler of Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, 
failed to take a prompt decision about the future shape of his state and it is only after 
being confronted by a compelling situation created as a result of the tribal entry into 
the state that he acceded to the Indian dominion by signing the instrument of 
accession on 26 October 1947. Under the instrument of accession, powers concerning 
Defence, External Affairs and Communication were transferred to the Indian 
                                               
8Baba, Noor Ahmad. "Kashmir Special Status and the Political Dynamics of Centre State Relations." 
In Politics of Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir, by R D Sharma, Rekha Chowdhry, Jagmohan Singh, 
Ashutosh Kumar Hari Om, 222. Jammu: Vinod Publishers , 1999.
9 Ibid.
6dominion. The National Conference Leaders while endorsing the accession did not 
want the quantum of accession to exceed the items which had been transferred to 
dominion government under the instrument of accession. Negotiations on the 
provisions in the proposed constitution of India in relation to the Jammu and Kashmir 
state’s membership of union began when a meeting of leaders of the national 
conference and of the central leadership was held in Delhi from 15 to 16 March 1949. 
After the hectic negotiations the state of Jammu and Kashmir was then accorded a 
special status under article 370 of Indian constitution. Thus, on the promulgation of 
the constitution on 26 January1950, it became clear that only two of its Articles, viz. 
Article1, which declared Jammu and Kashmir to be the part of Indian Union, and 
Article 370, which defined the special status granted to the state, became applicable to 
Jammu and Kashmir.
While framing the constitution, incorporation of Article 370 was not an easy 
task from very beginning of Indian state in 1947. Political forces did not favour a 
truly federal state to emerge in India in the background of partition they provided 
what K.C Wheare describes as Quasi-federal state in which powers weighted more in 
favour of centre. In this context provision of article 370 provided a different model 
and it limited the accession to only three items (Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Communications) in relation to Kashmir. But there were some integrationist elements 
in centre that look nation building project from more centralized and integrationist 
perspective. That is why from the very beginning of the constitutional operation a 
number of forces in India got activated against the retention of article 370. The 
assimilationist’s arguments and their practice has been perceived and experienced as 
betrayal in Kashmir. The eventual erosion of the special position that Kashmir had 
secured further intensified their sense of alienation. The pressure for the erosion 
started shortly after the adoption of the Indian constitution in 1950. As a result, the 
cordiality between the governments headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was replaced with anger, animosity and frustration against 
each other. This ultimately led to the dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the 
main propounder of state’s autonomy. This facilitated the process of greater merger of 
the state within the Indian Union beginning with the presidential Order 1954. This 
7perspective has lead to gradual erosion of autonomy and has been one of the 
contributing factors for alienation in Kashmir which resulted armed struggle in 
1990’s.
With the eruption of violence and rise of separatist sentiments the conflict in 
Kashmir consumes a lot of human, economic, social and psychological resources. 
Any attempt at resolving Kashmir issue requires study of various conflict resolution 
mechanisms. In pursuit of this, several proposals have been offered. Some people 
wanted Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, others wanted Kashmir’s accession to India, 
while some proposing for complete independence of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Mainstream political parties of the state also produced their proposals, Jammu and 
Kashmir National Conference has sought pre-1953 autonomy status for Kashmir. 
Many people and international groups have proposed different models, Aland Islands 
models is one such model which deserve a thorough analysis and examination as for 
as  conflict resolution in the context of Kashmir problem is concerned.
The dispute over the Aland Islands arose when, after World War I, Finland 
gained its independence from Russia following a Civil War. The Islands, along with 
Finland had been ruled by Russia since 1809 as part of the Duchy of Finland, but the 
Aland Islanders, who were culturally Swedish, sought to join Sweden. When Sweden 
and Finland were unable to resolve the dispute, the situation was referred to the 
League of Nations. In 1921 Sweden and Finland agreed to an autonomy arrangement 
that provided the Aland Islanders protections for their Swedish cultural and language 
heritage, territorial autonomy and demilitarization of the islands, which lie close to 
the Swedish coast. Today the Aland Islands is the wealthiest region in Finland, and 
eleventh richest area within the European Union.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
In June 1921 the League’s Council presented a compromise decision which 
offered something to each of the three parties to the conflict, Finland, Sweden and 
Aland. Finland was granted sovereignty over Aland, but was placed under an 
obligation to guarantee to the population of the Islands their Swedish culture, 
language, local customs and the system of self-government that Finland had offered 
Aland in 1920. The decision was supplemented with an agreement between Finland 
and Sweden on how the guarantees were to be realized. The League also decided that 
8a treaty governing Aland’s demilitarization and neutralization should be drawn up to 
ensure that the Islands would never become a military threat to Sweden.
Politicians, academics and journalists around the world often study Aland as an 
example of a successful solution to a minority or territorial conflict. The division of 
power between Aland and Finland and the principle that any amendment to that 
division requires the consent of both parties, as well as the right of domicile, the 
restrictions on land purchases and Aland’s power to influence international treaties 
are some of the aspects of Aland’s autonomy that have attracted the interest of outside 
observers. Aland is considered a unique case for several reasons. Its autonomy has 
existed for a long time, the solution was arrived at without force of arms, and Aland is 
both a self-governing and demilitarized province.
Current study starts with the historical perspectives of Jammu and Kashmir 
and Aland conflicts. How international organizations were involved into the conflicts 
and then what has been the result of their mediation and involvement? The second 
chapter, Kashmir Autonomy Pre-Post-1953, explain comprehensively, how and in 
what circumstances Jammu and Kashmir was granted special status under Indian 
constitution. This chapter also lays emphasis on how Centre gradually eroded 
Kashmir autonomy. Third chapter of the study deals with features of Aland Islands 
Autonomy. This chapter locates Aland Islands Autonomy in different institutional 
mechanism like Constitutional law of Finland, International and supranational 
character of Aland autonomy, demilitarization and neutralization of Aland Islands. In 
chapter four, “Comparative Study of Kashmir and Aland Autonomy Models”, a brief 
theoretical understanding of Autonomy is delineated, followed by conflict history of 
both the regions; Aland Island and Jammu and Kashmir. In the same chapter, 
comparison of both the models of autonomy will be made at the institutional, 
constitutional, provincial level is also thoroughly analyzed.
In the conclusion part of the study, attempt has been made to ascertain reasons 
for success of Aland Autonomy and lack of comparable success for Autonomy in 
Jammu and Kashmir. There are many features for which Aland Autonomy is 
considered valuable model for intra or interstate conflict resolution. An attempt has 
also been made to look into possibility of incorporating elements of Aland Autonomy 
9model within the Kashmir context and its relationship with the centre in Delhi. 
The methodological framework of this study is a comparative analysis of the 
Kashmir and Aland Islands autonomy models. Both these cases have been compared 
on a point to point basis. Though, the structure of the two case studies might not be 
absolututely identical but still this comparison is thought to be quite helpful in 
understanding the differences and in bringing out an approach to fill the gaps.
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Chapter 2
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE KASHMIR AND THE ALAND 
CONFLICTS
The Kashmir conflict
The state of Jammu and Kashmir in its Pre-1947 structure came into existence 
as a result of the treaty of Amritsar, signed between Lord Harding who was the then 
Governor General of the possessions of the East India Company and Raja Gulab 
Singh who was the Dogra ruler of Jammu ,on 16 March 1846 at Amritsar. The treaty 
stipulated that the British government transfers to Raja Gulab Singh areas namely the 
Kashmir valley including Ladakh, Hunza Nagar and Gilgit. In return Raja Gulab 
Singh had to pay a sum of rupees Seventy five lakhs (Nanakshahee) and also to 
provide military support to the British when required. Moreover, Gulab Singh 
acknowledging the supremacy of the British government undertook to present 
annually to the British government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved 
breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls. Since this treaty 
of Amritsar was signed, Jammu and Kashmir remained under the Dogra rulers for 
almost a century (1846-1947). At the political juncture of 1947, all the 563 princely 
states constituting one-third of British India along with the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir were released from the control of British paramountcy. These princely states 
were left with an option to accede to either of the two dominions India or Pakistan, in 
line with geographical contiguity and wishes of the people. The rulers of these states 
could even decide to remain independent. However, Lord Mountbatten the last British 
Viceroy of India insisted categorically that the third option was merely nominal. 
Almost all other princely states had relatively smooth integration with either of the 
two dominions under Indian Independence Act of 1947. In case of Jammu and 
Kashmir the final political dispensation got complicated because of its heterogeneous 
nature in terms of culture, linguistic composition, ethnic composition of the society, 
religious diversity and also because of its varied geographical location. Moreover, the 
indecisiveness on the part of Maharaja Hari Singh the then ruler of Jammu and 
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Kashmir state, on weather to accede India or Pakistan further complicated the 
situation. Even though Maharaja Hari Singh had signed an agreement known as 
‘Standstill Agreement’ which asked for maintaining a kind of status quo for time 
being with Pakistan, but this was not final and permanent. Therefore, the political 
parties and the leaders who were enjoying the trust and confidence of the people of the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir started persuading the Maharaja to join the dominions of 
their interest. There were forces active for Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan and forces 
that wanted Kashmir to accede to India. In addition, there has always been a strong 
opinion in favour of Kashmir remaining independent. However, none of the forces had 
an easy choice because of various checks and balances operating from within and 
outside.1Finally, confronted by the compelling situation created as a result of the tribal 
entry on 22 October 1947 into Jammu and Kashmir, from the frontiers of Kashmir 
through Hazara district of the North-western Frontier province, Maharaja Hari Singh 
wrote a letter to government of India requesting them for military assistance to defend 
his territory from this tribal invasion. The Maharaja left Srinagar and at Jammu again 
he requested Government of India for military assistance in the following words:
Geographically my state is contiguous to both the dominions. It has 
vital economic and cultural links with both of them. Besides, my 
state has a common boundary with soviet Republic and China. In 
their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot 
ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion 
I should accede, or whether it is not in the best interests of both the 
Dominions and my state to stand independent, of course with 
friendly and cordial relations with both. With the conditions 
obtaining at present in my state and my great emergency of the 
situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the 
Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by 
me without my state acceding to the Dominion of India. I 
                                               
1 Noor Ahmad Baba, Kashmir Special Status: Myth and Reality, in V. R Raghvan (ed) Conflict in 
Jammu and Kashmir: Impact on Polity, Society and Economy, New Delhi, 2012, p. 188.
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haveaccordingly decided to do so and I attach Instrument of 
Accession for acceptance by your government.2
On 25 October 1947, a cabinet committee meeting on defence was held 
under the chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten and it was decided that help will be 
given. However, Lord Mountbatten told that it would be height of the folly to 
send the troops into a neutral state, where we had no right to send them, since 
Pakistan could do exactly the same, which could only result in a war. Therefore, 
Lord Mountbatten urged that the legal formalities regarding accession should be 
completed but that it should only be temporary, prior to a referendum, plebiscite, 
election or even if these methods were impracticable, by representative public 
meetings.3 Thus, while conveying the acceptance of the instrument of accession 
to the Maharaja, Lord Mountbatten wrote to Maharaja;
In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness my 
Government has decided to accept the accession of Kashmir state 
to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the 
case of any state where the issue of accession has been the subject 
of dispute the question of accession should be decided in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, it is my 
Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been 
restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question 
of the state’ accession should be settled by a reference to the 
people. Meanwhile in response to your Highness’ appeal for 
military aid action has been taken today to send troops of the 
Indian army to Kashmir to help your forces to defend your territory 
and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.4
                                               
2 Samir Ahmad, Musharraf’s Four-Point Formula: A Study in Kashmiri Response, Dissertation 
Submitted to the University of Kashmir, Srinagar, 2010, Chap. 1. 
3 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict; India Pakistan and Unending War, I.B.Tauris, New York, 
2010, pp. 52-53.
4 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, “Kashmir, India Pakistan”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, No. 3, April 
1965, pp. 528-538.
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Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947 
and with the result Indian army enters in the state on 27 October 1947 to prevent 
and resist the tribal entry. The fight intensified and the Pakistan sent regular forces 
resulting in the first war over Kashmir between India and Pakistan. In January 
1949, that is exactly after one  year, a ceasefire agreement between Indian and 
Pakistani leaving India in control of the valley and parts of Jammu and Ladakh, 
while Pakistan gains control of the parts which Pakistan calls ‘Azad Kashmir’ and 
Northern territories (Gilgit and Baltistan). 
The instrument of accession also resulted into an Emergency Administration 
for Jammu and Kashmir which came into effect in March 1948 and  Sheikh 
Abdullah became its head. The first Cabinet comprised of Bakshi Ghulam 
Muhammad, Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq, 
Girdharilal Dogra and Sarddar Budh Singh, Mubarak Shah and D. P. Dhar, were 
inducted as Deputy Ministers. Moreover, under the instrument of accession, 
powers concerning defence, external affairs and communication were transferred 
to the Indian Dominion. It was also proposed that as soon as the invaders will be 
pushed back from the territory Jammu and Kashmir, a referendum will be held to 
ascertain the wishes of the general public in the state and that will be taken as the 
base for final shape over the status of the state. In this regard Governor General 
Lord Mountbatten said, “it is my government’s wish that as soon as the law and 
order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the 
question of the state’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”5
This promise was corroborated by the then Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal 
Nehru in a radio broadcast on 2nd November 1947 in the following words; 
We decide to accept this accession and to send troops by air, but 
we made a condition that the accession would have to be 
considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order 
were established…
                                               
5 White paper on Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, 1948.
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And here let me make clear that it has been our policy all along 
that where there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either 
Dominion, the decision must be made by the people of that state. It 
was in accordance with this policy that we added a provisoto the 
Instrument of Accession of Kashmir…
               …we have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately 
to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the 
Maharaja Hari Singh has supported it, not only to the people of 
Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot, back out it. We 
are prepared when peace and law and order have been established 
to have referendum held under international auspices like United 
Nations. We want it to be fair and just reference to the people, we 
shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and just offer…”6
From the day the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was executed by Maharaja 
Hari Singh and Union of India, Kashmir has become bone of contention between India 
and Pakistan. It has been India’s argument that the state of Jammu and Kashmir has 
become part of Indian Union as the Maharaja has signed the instrument of accession 
and later ratified by the Jammu and Kashmir state constituent assembly. While as 
Pakistan has always questioned the nature and legality of this accession mainly on 
three grounds7; 
 The instrument signed by the Maharaja has violated the “Stand Still 
Agreement” which Maharaja Hari Singh had signed with the government of 
Pakistan.
 The Instrument of Accession was provisional and conditional. Unless that 
condition of holding a free and fair referendum under the auspices of United 
Nations Organization, through which wishes of the people would be 
ascertained, is not fulfilled, the accession cannot be called legal and valid.
 Kashmir is geographically contiguous to Pakistan than to any other country. It 
has had strong economic, trade and cultural links with Pakistan in the 
                                               
6 Abdullah, n. 3
7 Samir Ahmad, n.1. 
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past.Besides, it is a Muslim majority State. Therefore under the India 
Independence Act 1947 there is a strong base for the state joining Pakistan.
Kashmir in the UNO 
India by invoking article 35 of the UN Charter filed a complaint against 
Pakistan on 1 January 1949 and urged the member countries that Pakistan should be 
declared as the aggressor as it has invaded the state of Jammu and Kashmir, now part 
of India under the instrument of accession signed between Maharaja of Jammu and 
Kashmir and government of India. Pakistan on the other hand denied all the 
allegations and in turn alleged that India had secured the accession of Kashmir by 
fraud and violence. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in response formed 
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in February 1948. After 
which United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions and forwarded 
many proposals like McNaughton in 1949, Sir Own Dixon Plan in 1950 and Frank 
Graham Proposal in 1951 to resolve the Kashmir problem. Some of the main 
resolutions passed in this regard are:
 The first resolution was passed on 17 January 1948. It is recommended that the 
Pakistan government should withdraw the tribal groups and other Pakistani 
nationals who were operating in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. On the other 
hand India was told to reduce the number of its military forces to the minimum 
strength required for the maintenance of law and order in the state. The 
recommendation further proposed the nomination of a plebiscite administrator 
with adequate powers to ensure a free and fair plebiscite in the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir.
 The next resolution was passed on 13 August 1948 by the United Nations 
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The resolution called for an 
immediate cease-fire along the border, the appointment of a military observer 
to monitor the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistani troops 
and also that the evacuated territory be administered by the local authorities 
under the surveillance of the commission.8 Under the resolution, government 
                                               
8 See, Josef Korbel, “Danger in Kashmir”, Princeton: Princeton University, 1954. pp. 118-121.  
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of India was asked to reduce its military presence till such time when the final 
solution to the dispute was reached. Further, both the nations; India and 
Pakistan were asked to reaffirm their agreement that the people of the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir will decide the final political destination of their state 
through a free and fair plebiscite.
 On 5 January 1949, UNCIP after correspondence with the governments of the 
two dominions adopted a third resolution supplementing the 13 august 1948 
United Nations resolution. The resolution called for an accession of the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan through the democratic method of a 
free and impartial plebiscite. The plebiscite was to be held when the 
commission was convinced that the cease-fire and the truce arrangements set 
forth in Parts I and II of the Commission’s resolution were completed with. A 
plebiscite administrator who shall be a personality of high international 
standing and commanding general confidence was to be appointed by the 
secretary general of the United Nations and he would be equipped with the 
powers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring 
the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The Governments of India and Pakistan and all other authorities 
within the State of Jammu and Kashmir were to collaborate with the plebiscite 
administrator in putting this provision into effect and would make sure that 
there is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribing or other undue influences on 
the participation of the voters during the plebiscite.
Although Kashmir became an international issue and was debated in UN 
because of the active participation of both the counties India and Pakistan. But within 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir a number of other developments had started casting 
shadow on relations between union of India and state of Jammu and Kashmir. One of 
the most important developments was dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah the 
then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.  
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Dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Internal dimension of the 
Kashmir Issue 
After the enactment of the Constitution of India on 26th January 1950 
regulation of affairs between Indian Union and the state of Jammu and Kashmir were 
defined under the Article 370 of Indian constitution. It was outlined that the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir because of its exceptional historical back ground will be given a 
special position under the Article 370 of the Indian constitution. The nature of this 
relation was further elaborated and finalized in the Delhi Agreement between Sheikh 
Muhammad Abdullah the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952.9
However, on August 9, 1953 the Indian government took radical step and 
dismissed Sheikh Abdullah and as a replacement Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad was 
appointed as the new Prime Minister of the State. Immediately after Sheikh Abdullah 
was arrested subsequently the special provisions granted to the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir under Article 370 were either fully or partially abrogated. For instance the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir was brought under the jurisdiction of the supreme court 
                                               
9  The main features of the Delhi Agreement were as follows:
 The decision to abolish hereditary Dogra monarchy was accepted by New Delhi
 Indian Citizenship Act was made applicable to the State but the State legislature was 
empowered to regulate the rights and privileges of permanent residents especially in 
regard to the acquisition of immovable property and appointment to services
 Indian President was empowered to declare a State of Emergency in case of external 
dangers but in case of internal disturbance, the power could be exercised at the 
request or with the concurrence of the State Government
 President of India was empowered to reprieve or commute death sentences
 India agreed that confiscation  of Jagirs without compensation shall permanently 
stand
 The State was allowed its own flag, which was the flag of the National Conference 
Party
 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was extended in certain matters
 It was agreed that Jammu and Ladakh should have cultural and regional autonomy
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of India and also the authority of the Auditor General and the planning commission of 
India were extended over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition to furnish  
further integration of the state of the Jammu and Kashmir  with the Indian union ,a 
presidential order was promulgated  on Jan 26,1960 in which the provision of the 
Indian constitution regarding election were  directly made applicable  to the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir .
This way the Indian union cemented the integration of Jammu and Kashmir 
with the rest of India. Elections were held in the state and the state was mainly ruled 
by those governments which had centres will behind as alleged by many   the manner 
in which lections were conducted and the tempered democratic process  in the state, 
termination of contacts with other region of Kashmir which is under the control of 
Pakistan, resulted in alienations and widened gap  between people of the state and 
ruling governments at centre which finally took an ugly turn in late 1988s.when an 
armed struggle was started in the state against the Indian union .India on its part has 
retaliated by deploying  Army and other defence  forces to curb the armed movement 
.people of state  have suffered enormously for  last  24 year s and there has been huge 
loss of life and property
Historical Perspective of the Aland Conflict
The Aland Islands are located in the northern Baltic Sea, at the entrance of Gulf 
of Bothnia between Finish and Swedish mainland. The Aland Islands is an 
archipelago of more than small 6000 islands and Skerries. Its total area is about 
13,517 km out of which eighty nine percent (89%) is water area. The islands are 
inhabited by about 26000 people about ninety percent (90%) of whom live on the 
main island. The strategic importance of the islands derives from their location 
between the mainland of Finland and Sweden. About 40 kms to the west is the 
Swedish coastline, while in the East the Aland Islands archipelago is almost 
contiguous to the Finnish archipelago. To control these islands in the past was a key of 
controlling much of the northern parts of the Baltic Sea10. Aland Islands under 
                                               
10Aland Islands as a conflict Resolution model:  Paper presented at the IPRA conference. Leuven 
15.19.2008
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Swedish occupation from 1157 to 1809 provided a base against Russia. And when 
under Russian occupation from 1809 to 1917 they used it as a base against Sweden. 
Being located at the entrance of Gulf of Bothnia The Aland Islands enabled its 
possessor to control the accesses of ships to the other parts of the Gulf of Bothnia.
James Barros in his book The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of 
Nations (1965) classifies the modern history of the Aland Islands (Ahuenanmaa)11
into three distinctperiods: 
 Swedish occupation from 1157 to 1809
 Russian occupation from 1809 to 1917
 Finnish control from 1917 to the present. 
These altering occupations made it clear that the key factor determining the possession 
of the Aland Islands have been geography and struggle for control of the Baltic 
region12.Aland Islands have been a subject of geopolitical games by various powers 
over centuries due to their strategic location. In 1714, the region was occupied, albeit 
for a short time, by Russia under Peter the Great13. During the consecutive years, 
Russia and Sweden fought  a number of wars to gain control on the region. It was only 
after the 1808-1809 military campaign, Russia finally managed to control the Aland
Islands and other Finnish territories that were previously under Swedish control. As a 
result Sweden’s hegemony was over and Russia emerged as the dominant power in 
the Baltic region. This was then confirmed by the Treaty of Fredrikshamn in 17, 
September 1809, when in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, Finland was ceded to 
Russia and Sweden received Norway as compensation. Thus, after 1809, Aland
Islands as part of the autonomous Finland’s territory also were under Russian control. 
When Russia began to strengthen its fortifications in Aland in the 1830s, this was 
perceived as a threat in England, and the British already in 1833 alerted the Swedes to 
the danger that arose from Russian fortifications in the islands. The construction of 
Bomarsund Fortress on the mainland of Aland was launched in 1832. In addition to 
                                               
11 Barros, like many others, uses the name Aland in English, but its name in fact begins with Å (O in    
Swedish language), and his spelling of the name in Finnish also has a typo; it is Ahvenanmaa
12 James Barros, Aland Island Question, Its Settlement by League of Nation, 1968, p. 1.
13 See article published in Zerkalonewspaper(Baku) by TalehZiyadov.
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the massive main fortress it was planned to have fourteen defence towers, but only 
three of them were completed.
Throughout the 19th century, the issue that dominated Swedish-Russian talks 
were militarization or demilitarization of the Aland Islands, though Stockholm 
continued to raise questions of unification with the region on international stage. 
Sweden demanded neutralization of the islands “as an independent state under the 
protection of France, England and Sweden”14 — a demand that was supported by 
Great Britain, but was dismissed by Russia. Russian Government considered the 
obligation of non-fortification of Aland islands as an intolerable limitation of its 
sovereignty and “a humiliating restriction on Russia”15. The situation changed because 
of the Russian difficulties after Crimean war (1853-56)16.Which forced the Czar to 
uphold the old Swedish request and accept the demilitarization of the Islands. The  
Crimean War which broke out in 1854, although it concerned mainly the Balkans and 
the Black Sea, England and France which supported Turkey against Russia wanted to 
have another front in the North and therefore brought their navies and to some degree 
also land forces to the Baltic Sea. Especially in the summer of 1854 the British Navy 
made devastating attacks against several coastal towns of Finland, destroying some of 
them thoroughly. Together with the French forces it occupied the Aland Islands in 
August 1854 and completely destroyed the Bomarsund Fortress, after which Aland
was declared to be free “under Western powers protection”17. The British support 
made it easy for the Swedish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to get the 
demilitarization of the Islands, which was laid down in a specific convention signed in 
Paris on 30 March 1856 and annexed to Article 33 of the Paris Peace Treaty. 
According to this Convention, Russia was not bound towards Sweden, which had not 
                                               
14 James Barros, Op. Cit., p.8.
15 Ibid., p.2
16 For a comprehensive survey of the war events and the diplomatic confrontations affecting Åland, 
including the relative settlement at the Paris peace conference, see James Barros, Aland Island 
Question, Its Settlement by League of Nation, 1968.
17 The Aland Islands as a conflict resolution model, Paper presented at the IPRA Conference, Leuven 
15-19.7.2008
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taken part in the war and was not a party to the agreement. Still the situation clearly 
advantaged Sweden which could always rely on the protection of the other signatory 
parties – namely Britain and France – against any Russian attempt to fortify the 
Archipelago.18
During the Crimean war the Aland Islands were occasionally isolated from the 
rest of Finland and both among the Aland islanders and in Sweden the idea of 
incorporating Aland back to Sweden was alive for some time, whereas in the mainland 
Finland the majority of the population reacted negatively on the Western Powers war 
activities and remained loyal to the Czar. Sweden’s King Oscar I obviously for some 
time during the war kept alive the wish to get the whole of Finland back to Sweden, 
and for this reason did not actively support the separatism of Aland. Sweden desired a 
limitation of Russian naval forces in the Baltic and either the restitution of the Aland
Islands to Sweden or their neutralization under the collective guarantee of France, 
England and Sweden. In Finland there were also some voices, but no real movement 
for the idea that Finland should again become part of Sweden. In negotiations between 
England, Russia, France and Sweden, the restitution of Aland (or Finland as a whole) 
to Sweden was immediately dismissed by Russia and not actively supported by France 
either, and therefore England’s and Sweden’s interests merged in their minimum 
demand of demilitarization and non-fortification of the islands. Regarding the legal 
status of Aland, the important legacy of the Crimean War was the demilitarization of 
the islands. England and France were able to impose that condition in the peace treaty 
of Paris in 1856, annexed as Article 33, and the Russian Czar had no choice but to 
issue his ‘consent’ for the agreement. The arrangement was made part of the Treaty 
terminating the Crimean War which implied that it was now part of a wider European 
settlement which gave the restriction to greater forces19. Barros states that for the next 
fifty years after the war the situation continued undisturbed, and that “inevitably the 
                                               
18 Claudio Scarpulla, The Constitutional Framework for the Autonomy of Åland: A Survey of the 
Status of an Autonomous Region in the throes of European Integration 
MeddelandenfrånÅlandshögskola nr 14, Mariehamn 2002  
19 For the history of the Crimean War and its impact on the Åland Islands issue as well as on the 
negotiations leading to the Peace Treaty of Paris, see e.g.  Barros1968, pp. 1-12.
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continual execution of the convention by all parties and its respect by other made it 
part of the public law of Europe.”20
The issue re-emerged in the context of the dissolution of the union between 
Sweden and Norway in 1905, when Russia made an effort to get rid of the 1856 
restrictions, but failed, due to England’s and Sweden’s position. The only result was 
that in 1908 Germany, Denmark, Russia and Sweden confirmed the territorial status 
quo of the contracting states but this did not in any way imply that Russia would have 
been released from her 1856 servitude. It can also be noted that England and France 
were not signatories of the 1908 declaration. Russia’s attempt, however, had a 
negative impact on Swedish-Russian relations, and in 1912 Russia’s new foreign 
minister Sazanov tried to reassure the Swedes that Russia had no hostile intentions. 
Sazanov’s own thinking as summed up by Barros is worth noting, because it tells 
something essential about the attitudes towards non-fortification. Sazanov “thought 
that during times of peace no fortifications on the islands were necessary and were in 
fact politically undesirable, since they frightened the Sweden and threw them into the 
arms of Germany. On the other hand, during times of war the archipelago could be 
easily defended to prevent the entrance and exit of enemy forces from the Gulf of 
Bothnia.”21
Although Russia in 1906 had dispatched troops to the Aland Islands and sent 
naval units to patrol the archipelago meanwhile England and France did not lodge any 
protests as the official British position was that it had no information about the 
Russia’s invasion, and contemplating “any breach of the provisions of the Treaty of 
Paris by fortifying the Aland Islands, or maintaining or creating military or naval 
establishments there”. During the First World War the situation changed more 
drastically as Russia began fortifications on the islands in order to prevent Germany’s 
takeover. In doing so the Russian government had to reassure Sweden which wanted 
to remain neutral in the war that after the war the fortifications would be removed as it 
is the necessary for the situation. But during the war other developments quite 
connected to the future of the Islands took place especially Finland’s growing 
                                               
20 Barros1968, pp. 12.
21Quote from Barros 1968, p. 17, the description of the developments in 1906 until 1914, pp. 12-19    
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independence movement. In 1915 a non official Finnish delegation approached the 
Swedish government with the idea of liberating Finland with Sweden’s support and in 
return it offered Sweden the Aland. Another Finnish activist group, although sharing 
the objective of Finland’s independence strongly opposed the idea of any cession of 
Aland Islands to Sweden; it felt that the islands belonged to Finland and not to Russia, 
and that giving them to Sweden would constitute Finland’s dismemberment.
On the Eve of the Finnish Independence
During the World War I, Germany promised to return the Aland Islands back to 
Sweden if the latter joined the war on the side of Germany. But Stockholm remained 
neutral and instead proposed to make the Aland Islands a neutral region too. Russia 
knew that Germany would try to occupy the Islands and was preparing itself for such 
an action. In a letter to the Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergei D. Sazonov, dated 
1,January 1915, the Minister of Marine, Vice-Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovich, 
highlighted the significance of the Aland Islands for Russia and wrote: “The whole 
area was of ‘great strategic importance’ and consequently the navy’s task was to keep 
the area firmly in Russia’s possession”. 
The transitional period began with the fall of Czarist government and the 
establishment of the provisional government. Shortly thereafter, the Bolsheviks seized 
power in Russia as a result of this existing political vacuum, Finland began calling for 
independence from Russia and people in Sweden started demanding unification with 
the Aland Islands. Finally, in December 1917, the Parliament of Finland (the Finnish 
Diet) declared its independence. The Alanders held a secret assembly that discussed 
the question of unification of the islands with Sweden. “A four-member delegation 
was chosen, with instructions to bring to the Swedish government and Parliament the 
knowledge that for special reason the ‘population of Aland deeply desired the 
reincorporation of its islands with the Kingdom of Sweden” .On December 25-29, the 
Alanders held “a sort of plebiscite” and signed a petition calling for unification 
addressed to King Gustaf of Sweden. This increased the hands of those elements in 
Sweden that advocated an immediate occupation of the Aland Islands. The Finnish 
counter argument was that not only had the islands been part of Finland historically, 
economically, geographically but they were only part of the Swedish-speaking 
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population of Finland and the Alanders were not a unit in themselves. Throughout the 
Paris conference, Finland strongly opposed Sweden’s demand for a plebiscite on the 
islands. Using the weakening position of Russia, King Gustaf of Sweden sent a note to 
Germany, Austria and Turkey demanding that the question of Aland Islands “be 
considered during the peace negotiations with Russians at Brest-Litovsk ‘in order to 
safeguard the vital interests of Sweden in those islands.’ Germany offered its help to 
Sweden by raising the issue of unification during negotiations with the Bolsheviks. In 
return, Germany listed the following demands:
 Sweden should allow the Islanders to decide the issue through a 
plebiscite
 Not fortifications on the Islands
 Islands should not be handed over to any other state power
 Initiate negotiation for an increase of iron ore exports to Germany after 
the war.
On 4 January 1918, however, Russia recognized the independence of Finland. 
Surprisingly Sweden recognized the Finnish independence the same day followed by 
recognitions from other European powers. Later, Helsinki would argue that Sweden 
and the other powers had by their unconditional recognition accepted the Aland
Islands as part of the sovereign Finnish state 
Several weeks after the recognition of Finland’s independence, a civil war 
broke in Finland. While King Gustaf had tried to act moderately and avoid direct 
confrontation with Finland, the Swedish opposition demanded the immediate takeover 
of the islands. Soon the Swedish government sent its naval ships to the islands and 
then occupied them. Later, German troops took control of Finland, including the 
Aland Islands. As for as the Status of the Aland Islands is concerned, Finnish 
independence did not settle the Aland question and negotiations between Finland and 
Sweden, as well as the Great Powers and Russia, continued. Helsinki accused 
Stockholm of supporting the Alanders in their demand for unification with Sweden 
and interfering in Finland’s internal affairs. This increased the tension between the 
two states. 
25
The Finish government informed the Alanders that it will guarantee full 
security for the islands and urgently requested them to avoid all acts which would 
injure Finland’s territorial integrity as this would not be tolerated. Sweden, on the 
other hand, insisted that the final status of the islands should be determined by a 
referendum among the Alanders, a proposal that Finish government vehemently 
rejected. Stockholm wanted the Alanders to build their own case for independence and 
make it more appealing for the world community. As early as the spring of 1918 
Stockholm advised the Alanders that independence could only be acquired by 
developing their own self-governing institutions, by an act of will of the Alanders 
themselves, as well as by organizing public opinion for a union of the islands with 
Sweden and for a plebiscite at the proper moment which the Swedish government 
would require from Finland.
At a certain point there were speculations that Finland was considering a 
territorial exchange giving up the Aland Islands to Sweden in return for Eastern 
Karelia a claim denied by the official statement of the then Finish government.22
Instead, the Finish government offered the Alanders some sort of self-governing 
autonomy within Finland.   
Aland Islands Question in League of Nations
The negotiations between Stockholm and Helsingfors (the modern day 
Helsinki) had not been successful and the parties agreed to refer the Aland Islands 
status question to the League of Nations. As the Great Powers attempted to mediate 
between the parties to the issue still the situation in Sweden and Finland deteriorated. 
The public opinion in both countries hardened which raised the level of necessity for 
the urgent resolution of the status issue. Eventually, the League of Nations established 
two consecutive commissions, the Commission of Jurists and the Commission of 
Inquiry, to deal with the Aland question. The first commission was to study the 
political, legal and historical aspects of the Aland question and recommend possible 
solutions, which it did after listening to arguments of the parties and completing its 
                                               
22 See Barros, 1968, pp. 70.
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own investigation. The second commission was to focus on the details of 
recommended solutions and finalize the agreement. 
The Commission of Jurists examined the historical and legal aspects of the 
issue. The Jurists believed that the primary question is legal one namely, Finland’s 
right to sovereignty over the Aland Islands. Here they wished to discuss whether 
Finland was a sovereign state after its union with Czarist Russia had been resolved 
and whether Finland’s sovereignty extended to the islands as it did to other parts of 
Finland on the question of Finland’s right over the Aland Islands. The Commission 
concluded that “independent Finland in 1917 had included the island group and 
Finland’s subsequent recognition by other states” meant that "Finnish sovereignty 
over the Aland Islands was ‘incontestable’ and that legally the Islands formed a part of 
the Finnish state. Furthermore, the question of a state’s territorial integrity versus the 
minority right to self-determination, which is still relevant today, was also discussed 
by the Commission. The question such as “was it possible to acknowledge as an 
absolute rule that a minority in a state had ‘the right of separating itself from her in 
order to be incorporated in another State or to declare its independence?” was 
discussed in the Commission’s report. Quoting from the report, Barros writes, “To 
concede to either linguistic or religious minorities or to any ‘fractions of a population 
the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their 
wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and 
to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible 
with the idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.”
Finally, on the status of the Alanders in the Finnish state, the Commission of 
Jurists recommended that: 
 In the province of Aland exclusively, primary schools and technical schools 
should give instructions only in Swedish, to the ‘obligatory exclusion of 
Finnish, confirmed by law,’ and the Alanders be accorded the right of pre-
emption on every occasion.
 When offers to purchase land are made by outsiders, that newly arrived settlers 
in the islands be granted the franchise only after a stay of five years
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 The Alanders be allowed to present a list of three candidates to the government 
at Helsingfors [the modern day Helsinki] for the position of governor, who was 
to be chosen only from this list.
The Commission threatened to push the referendum idea in the Aland Islands if 
the Finnish government refused to adhere to the above recommendations. These 
recommendations were to be adapted to the existing provision on autonomy by the 
Finnish government. The final decision on the Aland question was delivered on June 
24, 1921 and the League of Nations reaffirmed Finland’s sovereignty over the Aland
Islands. Three days later, on June 27, Sweden and Finland signed the peace accord 




KASHMIR AUTONOMY PRE AND POST 1953
After the accession of Jammu and Kashmir with India in 1947 an emergency 
administration, headed by Sheikh Abdullah, was set up in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Consequently, Sheikh Abdullah became constitutional Prime-Minister of the 
State and assumed political as well as the administrative powers to run the state 
affairs. While as in the absence of Maharaja Hari Singh his son Dr. Karan Singh 
became the head of the State.  Given the situation and sequence of the events which 
led to the accession of Jammu And Kashmir State with India, Sheikh Abdullah wanted 
to confer only limited power to the union of India as for as centre-state relationship 
was concerned. Within this background a meeting was held in may 1949 between the 
leaders of the national conference, the dominant political party of the state headed by 
sheikh Abdullah, and the government of India which resulted in certain principles to 
govern the relationship between India and the state of Jammu and Kashmir some of 
the principles are highlighted below:
1. The constitution of Jammu and Kashmir would be framed by the people of 
state through their representatives in the constituent assembly.
2. Maharaja Hari Singh’s future would be determined by the same constituent 
assembly. 
3. The division of power between centre and the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
would be governed by the provisions of Instrument of Accession.
4. The constituent assembly would decide the grant of further powers to the 
central    government including the powers relating to citizenship, fundamental 
rights and directive principles of state policy.
5. The Government of India would take over the operational and administrative 
control of the state army. 
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As a result of these agreed principles, a draft of the ‘Article-306A’ was placed 
before the Constituent Assembly of India and as a result the relations between the 
Central government and state of Jammu and Kashmir were placed as under.
1. The provisions of the constitution of India with regard to the government in 
other Indian states, which had acceded to dominion of India, will not apply to 
Jammu and Kashmir as it has reserved the power to draft a constitution to its 
government.
2. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was empowered to establish a constituent 
assembly representing the people of the state to draft its own constitution.
3. The central government was empowered to legislate in regard to the state on 
the subjects enumerated in the union list, which were declared by the President 
of India to   correspond to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession 
and such other   matters in concurrence with the Government of the state, the 
President would by word specify.
4. The provisions of the constitution of India pertaining to citizenship, 
fundamental rights and directive principle of the state policy, embodied in the
constitution of Indian were to apply to the state.
5. The other provision of the constitution of India were to apply to the state by an 
order of the Indian President, which he was empowered to issue with 
concurrence of the government of the state except in case of the matters 
incidental to the constitutional provision for the government of the state and the 
subject transferred to the Government of India under the Instrument of 
Accession where the President of India was only required to consult the 
government of state.
6. The President of India was empowered to amend or repeat the special 
provisions for the state on recommendations of the Constituent Assembly of 
the state.
After these provisions were agreed, the Sheikh wrote to GopalaswamiAyyangar 
that the working committee of the National Conference did not agree with the Draft 
Article of Indian Constitution. They were fearful about the application of the 
provisions of the constitution of India with regard to citizenship and fundamental 
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rights. They feared that once ‘Fundamental Rights’ were applicable to the state the 
people from outside Jammu and Kashmir could acquire the local land and thus may 
hamper the land reforms in the state. Consequently Ayangar redrafted the Article but 
the revised draft was again rejected by National Conference. Finally a revised draft 
was agreed upon between the two representatives, one from central and other from 
state leadership. The revised draft was prepared by Ayangar in consultation with 
Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg and Article 306A became Article 370 in the Final 
Constitution of India. The very objective of this transitory provision is to afford the 
Kashmiris an opportunity to have association with the free democratic secular India 
and enable them to realize that their bright future is secured by becoming an integral 
part of the Union of India. Thus Article 370 of the Indian constitution became the sole 
repository of regulating the relationship between Union of India with the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir.
Under Article 370 Indian Legislative assembly could extended its powers over 
the state to external affairs, defence and communication only. While as other 
provisions of the Indian constitution could be extended to the state only with the prior 
concurrence of the state assembly.1Under one of the provisions of the article 370, it 
was decided that the state of Jammu and Kashmir would form a constituent assembly 
of 100 seats, out of which 25 seats would be reserved for the part of Jammu and 
Kashmir which came under Pakistani control after the January 1949 ceasefire 
agreement.  In 1951, Kashmir’s first post independence elections were held in which 
National Conference lead by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah secured all the 75 seats 
without any opposition as the election was boycotted by PrajaParishad. After 
becoming the first elected representative of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh 
Abdullah in his first speech before the constituent assembly on 5 November 1951 
said;
…The Indian constitution has set before the country the goal of a 
secular democracy based upon justice, freedom, and modern 
democracy…Pakistan is a feudal state in which a clique is trying to 
                                               
1 For details, see, “Article 370: A constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir” by A. G. Noorani, 
2011, New Delhi: OUP.
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maintain itself in power…from August 15 to October 22, 1947 our 
state was independent and the result was that our weakness was 
exploited by the neighbour with invasion.2
Thus, it seems quite obvious that Sheikh Abdulla was in favour of integrating the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India while at the same time retaining 
the ‘special status’ that was granted to it under article 370. In fact, he hoped that with 
secular and democratic nation of India he would be able to translate his Naya Kashmir
manifesto into reality and preserve the cultural diversity of his nation. The nature of 
this relationship was further elaborated and finalized in an agreement between Pt. 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdulla on 24 August, 1952, commonly known as 
“Delhi Agreement”. 
Some of the significant content’s of the agreement are3:
 All powers other than those specified in the instrument of accession to remain 
with the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
 The state government was empowered to regulate the rights of the state’s 
permanent residents.
 Fundamental rights of the Indian constitution to be made applicable to the 
state, but with some modifications so that land reforms could be carried out 
without paying any compensation.
 Hereditary rulership to be abolished
 Dispute mentioned in article 131 of the Indian constitution (center states and 
between states) to be dealt with by the Indian supreme court.
 The jurisdiction of the National Election Commission (NEC) to be confined to 
the parliamentary and presidential/vice presidential elections.
 Article 352 (declaration of emergency) to apply to the state in the case of 
external aggression only, but in the case of internal disturbance it could be 
applied only with the approval of the state government.
                                               
2 Sheikh Abdullah, as quoted in Teng and Koul, Kashmir’s Special Status, Appendix IV, p. 198.
3VerghenseKoithra (2004), “Crafting Peace in Kashmir Through a Realist Lens”, New Delhi: 2005 
Sage Publications, p. 56.
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 Article 356 (presidents rule) and article 360 (financial emergency) shall not be 
applicable to the state. 
PrajaParishad opposing the terms and conditions of accession of Jammu and 
Kashmir with India lanched a massive campaign in Jammu the main aim of the 
agitation was to oppose the special status granted to the state under article 370 of 
constitution of India. Their  slogan was ‘EkVidhan,EkNishan,EkPradhan’(One 
constitution , one Flag and one president).The underlying  cause of agitation started by 
the Praia parishad was that the Dogra rulers who had ruled the state for more than a 
century had lost all powers  in addition there was resentment in the Ladakh region as 
the people there thought that the Kashmiri leadership led by sheikh Abdullah will not 
be able to give equal justice to them and they will be marginalized adding to all this 
was a fact that the land reform movement launched by sheikh Mohammad Abdullah 
had made him the most popular leader of the state .This land reform process  led to 
riots in different parts of state and these were more instance in Jammu and Ladakh. 
The growing stature of Sheikh Abdullah in the state as a political leader and his 
changing attitude vis a vis Delhi in terms of putting newer and newer demands 
granting special status to the state. These with some other reasons led to a realization 
in Delhi that in depending on Sheikh Abdullah as a political leader in Jammu and 
Kashmir it might be difficult to keep together the multi-racial empire created by the 
Gulab Singh a century earlier.4 With the result, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as the 
head of the government on 8 August, 1953. On 9 August, 1953, Ghulam Mohammad 
Bakshi, a close associate of Abdullah was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of the 
state. BakshiShab was more agreeable to the policies of Delhi vis a vis the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir.
Given these turbulent times the state of Jammu and Kashmir was also taking 
steps for ensuring its special status within the union of India as granted under article 
370 and the framing of separate constitution of the state was one of the most 
significant step towards the end.
                                               
4 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2010, p. 81.
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The Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
The constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir which was charged with the 
task of framing the constitution for the state, presented the draft of the constitution in 
1956 for deliberation in the constituent assembly after intense and prolonged 
discussions  a separate constitution for the state was adapted  by the state  constituent 
assembly  on 7th of November  1956 and same came into force on 26th of January 
1957. With this the state of Jammu and Kashmir acquired the distinctions in the whole 
of union of India having a separate constitution to regulate its internal matters. The 
constitution of Jammu and Kashmir  is a written document initially in 1957 when it 
was promulgated  has 158 articles divided into 13 parts and there were also  6 
schedules  attached to it .some of the important features of the original constitution of  
Jammu and Kashmir  state are summarized  as below .
Separate Flag
Very important and significant exception has been made in case of only Jammu 
and Kashmir State. The constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (under sec 144) provided 
a separate flag of the state.
Dual Citizenship
Generally, in a federal setup a person is a citizen not only of the state in which 
he resides but also of the federation, under different conditions; and both the federal 
and State governments, each independent of the others, operating direct upon the 
citizen who is thus subject to the two governments and owe allegiance to both, but the 
Indian Constitution like Canadian, does not introduce any dual citizenship, only one 
citizenship i.e., the citizenship of India (Article 5), while as birth or residence in a 
particular state does not confer any separate citizenship. Here an important but 
controversial exception has been made through the constitution of India for the 
permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir grants 
dual citizenship to its permanent residents. Every person who is, or is deemed to be, a 
citizen of India shall be permanent resident of the State. If on the 14th May 1954 he 
was a State subject of class I and class II, or, having lawfully acquired immovable 
property in the State, he has been ordinarily resident in the State for not less than 10 
Years prior to that date.. Any person who before the fourteenth day of May, 1954, was 
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a State subject of class I or class II and who, having migrated after the first day of 
March 1947, to the territory now included in Pakistan, returns to the State under 
permit for the resettlement in the State or for permanent return issued by or under the 
authority of any law made by the State Legislature will on such return be a permanent 
resident of the State (s.6). The permanent residents will have all rights guaranteed to 
them under the Constitution of India (s.10).
Separate Directive Principles
Part IV of the Jammu and Kashmir’s Constitution (Section 11 to 25) enlists a 
few principles which are treated as fundamental in the governance of the state.
Fundamental Rights and Duties
The provisions of Fundamental rights of Indian constitution were applied to 
Jammu and Kashmir. State Government is fully empowered to impose reasonable 
restriction on freedom of assembly, association, movements, residence, etc, on an 
additional ground of the security of the state.
Headship of state
Under the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, there was a difference in the 
nomenclature for the head of the state. In the rest of India, the head of the State 
Executive is called “Governor” and he is appointed by the President (under Arts.152 
and 155), while as in the state of Jammu and Kashmir the Executive head of the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir was called Sadar-i-Riyasat and he was to be elected by the 
State Legislative Assembly. This anomaly has, however, been removed by the 
Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir under 6th Amendment Act, 1965, as result of 
which the nomenclature has been changed from Sardar-i-Riyasat to Governor and he 
is to be appointed like any other Indian state by President. In the result, there is no 
difference on this point, between Jammu and Kashmir and other states. 
State Boundaries
The constitution of India has empowered the Parliament to form or alter the 
state boundaries or names of the existing states (Article 3). But no bill seeking to 
increase or diminish the area or altering the name of boundaries of Jammu and 
Kashmir can be introduced in Parliament without the consent of the State Legislature.
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Emergency Provisions
No modern federation can ignore to provide for the assumption of large powers 
by the federal Government whenever united action is necessary by reason of emergent 
circumstances, external and internal. In India there are three different kinds of 
emergency situations which call for a departure from the normal government 
machinery set-up by the constitution, viz. a) Emergency due to war, external 
aggression, an armed rebellions (Article 352), b) failure of the constitutional 
machinery in the state (Article 356), c) financial Emergency (Article 360). If at any 
time the Governor is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of a 
state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Indian constitution, 
he has the power to assume to himself all or any of the powers of the Government of 
the state with the concurrence of the President of India. Hence in case of other states it 
is called Presidents role but in case of this state it is Governor’s rule.
Bicameral Legislature
The Legislature of the State will consist of the Governor and two houses, to be 
known respectively as the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council (Sec.46). 
The Legislative Assembly will consist of one hundred members' chosen by the direct 
election from territorial constituencies in the State and two women members 
nominated by the Governor. Twenty-four seats in the Legislative Assembly will. 
Remain vacant to be filled by the representatives of the people living in Pakistan 
occupied area of the State. The Legislative Council will consist of 36 members 
(Sec.59). Eleven members were elected by the members of the Legislative from 
amongst the persons who are residents of the provinces of Kashmir provided that of 
the members so elected at least one shall be a resident of Ladakh district and at least 
one a resident from Kargil district, the two outlying areas of the State Eleven members 
will be elected by the Legislative Assembly from amongst persons who are resident of 
Jammu Provence, The remaining 14 members will be elected by various electorates, 
such as Municipal Councils such as local bodies.
Judiciary
The High Court of the State will consists of a Chief justice and two or more 
other Judges (93). Every Judge of the High Court will be appointed by the President 
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after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Governor, and in the case of 
appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High 
Court.
Civil service
There will be a Public Service Commission for the State. The Commission 
along with its Chairman will be appointed by the Governor. Every member of the civil 
service or one holding a civil post will hold office under the pleasure of the Governor 
(Sec. 125).
Languages
The official language of the State will be Urdu. But English will unless the 
legislatures by Law or otherwise provides, continue to be used for all official purposes 
of the State (Sec.145).
Amendment
The State Constitution may be amended by introducing a Bill in the legislative 
Assembly and getting it passed in each House by a majority of not less than two-third 
of the total membership of that House. The extent of the executive and legislative 
powers of the State or the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in 
relation to the State shall be introduced or moved in either House of the Legislature.
Legislation Autonomy
In the sphere of Law making of the State Legislature enjoys a considerable 
amount of autonomy as compared to other states of India. The constitution of India 
enumerates elaborately the Legislative powers of the union and states in part XI of the 
constitution. It is further qualified by providing three lists. The union list with 97 
subjects, the concurrent list with 47 subjects and the state list with 66 subjects. In this 
division of powers an exception has been made in the case of state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. At the time of Accession of state of Jammu and Kashmir the union 
government was given the authority only in respect of three spheres, i.e., Defence, 
Foreign relation and Communications. With the passage of time and necessity the 
Union Government can make laws from the union list for the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir only in consultation with the Government of the state. So far as the 
concurrent list is concerned, only 17 subjects are common and the rest are with the 
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state. The state has control over state list and all residuary laws, Further the 
jurisdiction of Indian Parliament cannot be extended in the national interest (Article 
249), or for giving effect to international agreements (Article 253), with respect to a 
matter in the state list in the case of Jammu and Kashmir State. Thus, we find that the 
scope of law making powers to the union initially was on true federal principal for 
Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian constitution. 
The special status of Jammu and Kashmir as envisaged  in its own constitution  
and in the constitution of India  helped to a greater extent  in realization of the “Naya 
Kashmir” (New Kashmir) manifesto of the  national conference in its initial years 
from 1947-53.In contrast  the policy on the centre has always  been  to dilute and 
erode  the special status of  Jammu and Kashmir as granted under article 370 of the 
Indian constitution.
Gradual Erosion of Article 370 
The mainstream parties in New Delhi have always been to deny the federal 
structure of the Indian constitution, which is reflected in the integrities approach.  In 
this context the Indian leaders instead of educating the people about the need for a 
special constitutional position of Jammu and Kashmir, they always tried to create 
suspicion in the minds of Kashmiri leaders. Placing Article 370 before the Constituent 
Assembly, GopalaswamyAyyanger had expressed the hope that “in due course, even 
J&K will become ripe for some sort of integration that has taken place in case of other 
states”. Even Jawaharlal Nehru believed that there is nothing final about the Delhi 
Agreement. Communal elements did not approve of the Delhi Agreement. Some 
newspapers commented that, instead of Kashmir acceding to India, in fact, ‘India 
acceded to Kashmir.’ In the Jammu region of the State, PrajaParishad demanded that 
either the Constitution of India be applied to J&K in its entirety or Jammu be detached 
from Kashmir and merged with the Union of India. The PrajaParishad demanded 
homogeneity of the political process of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India. 
Strange enough, the support to PrajaParishad came from Jayaprakash Narayan and 
AcharyaKripalani. Sheikh Abdullah believed “Nehru and Maulana Azad were 
interested in the preposition but did not agree with the strategy”. It was in this 
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atmosphere of political hostility towards autonomous Kashmir that erosion of the 
special constitutional position started. 
Since 1950, the working and experience of Art-370 would show that though the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir has its own Constitution but the application of the Indian 
constitution is being extended gradually as a result, the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
is towards complete integration with the Union of India. In pursuance of this, then 
president of India issued as order (Order No: 48) on 14 May, 1954. The Order brought 
a notable progress in the area of application of Indian Constitution to the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. According to this Order, the jurisdiction Indian constitution will 
extend to all Union subjects, contrary to earlier position when it was applicable to 
only the three subjects i.e., defence, foreign affairs and communications. The notable 
feature of this order is that it became a strong base for the erosion of the article 370. 
As a result of this 94 out of the 97 Entries in the Union List and 26 out of the 47 in the 
Concurrent List of the Indian constitution were fully extended to the Jammu and 
Kashmir state. Similarly, 260 out of the 395 Articles and 7 out of 12 Schedules of the 
same constitution have been made applicable to the state. Similarly, on 21 November 
1964, Article 356 (imposition of President's Rule) was applied despite provision in the 
State’s Constitution for Governor’s rule (Section 92). In 1965, under the 6th
Amendment of Jammu and Kashmir Constitution the nomenclature of Sadar-i-Riyasat 
was replaced by Governor nominated by the Centre. This was done in violation of 
Section 147 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution.5
The process of erosion of special constitutional position hit at the most 
sensitive point of the Kashmiri psyche as it threatened the autonomy and identity of 
Kashmir for the protection of which the Kashmiris had laboured hard. Moreover, it 
even made the issue of accession controversial by projecting the degree of 
centralization of power as a measure of patriotism. Sheikh Abdullah now came to the 
conclusion that there was no middle course between full integration and full autonomy 
(which was his euphemism for independence) and as the majority of Kashmiris would 
                                               
5 Samir Samir Ahmad, Internal Dimension of the Kashmir Conflict: An Overview, Draft Paper 
Presented at the International Conference on Structuring Peace-The State and Conflict ransformation: 
Prospects and Challenges in South Asia at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences on April 17 – 18 2012.
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not accept the first alternative, there was no choice but to accept the second. He 
publicly resurrected the idea of full independence, as one possible option, among 
several for the future of Jammu and Kashmir. The mounting discontent in the Valley 
against the measures and moves of constitutional integration of the State with the 
Centre had one main outlet-separation. Rise of separatist sentiments in the Valley 
might have been one of the temptations for Pakistan to send armed infiltrators into the 
State in August 1965. Re-establishment of trust as expected from the Accord of 1975 
could not work plunging the State into a worse turmoil in 1989. The trouble in 
Kashmir cannot be dismissed as ISI inspired or a proxy war by Pakistan. Pakistan only 
exploited a situation created by successive Indian Governments in Kashmir. No less a 
person than George Fernandes who was Minister In charge of Kashmir Affairs during 
the Janata Dal government in 1990 said, “I do not believe any foreign hand created the 
Kashmir problem. The problem was created by us, others decided to take advantage of 
it.” Even Dr.Farooq Abdullah said in 1994, “It is India that is responsible for what has 
happened in Kashmir.” The former Chief Minister Mir Qasim observed, “If I dump 
petrol in my house and my opponent set a match to it, it is largely my fault. Wherever 
the entire people rise up in one voice you cannot suppress it by force.” The reference 
is towards the manner that the constitutional relationship between the Centre and state 
was conducted. Today we find the state has lost all resemblance to autonomy. Its 
erosion is the primary cause for Kashmir’s discontent in the eyes of the National 
Conference. The restoration of autonomy of state of Jammu and Kashmir as enjoyed 
by it till 1953 is thought to be a viable instrumentality for bringing peace in the State. 
This received both political as well as intellectual support from in and outside the 
State.
Greater Autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir 
The issue of autonomy has been on the agenda of  National Conference for 
many years . After its forced withdrawal from the political scene in the wake of 
militancy and mass upsurge in early 90's the National Conference used 'autonomy' as 
its main ideological plank to reclaim its political constituency in Kashmir. In its first 
central working committee meeting held in 1994, after a gap of five years, the party 
held the Union of India responsible for destroying the regional constitutional 
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arrangement of the people of Kashmir. It passed a resolution, which asserted that, 
“The time has come when this state of affairs should be revived in order to restore 
autonomy to its pristine and original form. It was defined with reference to the 
constitutional status of the state in pre-1953 period. So after installation of popular 
regime in the state in 1996 the first important step that the state government took was 
to found a state autonomy committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Karan Singh to 
‘examine and recommend measures for the restoration of autonomy to the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. This report was placed before the two houses of Jammu and 
Kashmir legislature on April 16, 1999. It was subsequently adopted by the state 
legislative Assembly on 26 June, 2000 and by the state Legislative Council on June 
27, 2000 by a thumping majority, this reflected the mood of people who always 
wanted a greater control of their state affairs.
Union Cabinet Rejects Jammu and Kashmir Assembly Resolution
The autonomy resolution was taken up by the union cabinet of India and on 4 
July, 2000 the Union Cabinet rejected the autonomy resolution, saying its acceptance 
would ‘reverse the natural process of harmonizing the aspiration of the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir with the integrity of the Nation.’ The union cabinet asserted that 
most of the recommendations would adversely affect the interests of the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir and were tantamount to removal of some of the essential 
safeguards enshrined in the constitution of India. The cabinet also disfavoured 
presentation of the report in the Parliament. In the word of former prime minister of 
India, Mr.AtalBihariVijpayee, “Farooq Abdullah had played his part by passing the 
resolution. The centre has played its part by rejecting it.6”
The resolution has received criticism from several quarters including the Indian 
National Congress and the BhartiyaJanata Party (BJP).Mr. Ram Jethmalani, the 
former law Minister of India, reacted by saying, “legally, it is a non-event but it has 
serious political implications.” However, later on he adopted a more conciliatory 
approach when he said that the ‘State Autonomy Report’ and the resolution it inspired 
were too general in their scope and if the State government could instead come up 
                                               
6Outlook, 17 July, 2000, p.26
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with specific details on the manner in which Union laws had hampered the interests of 
Jammu and Kashmir in their application, then the Centre would be more sympathetic 
towards it. ArunPoorie, Editor-in-Chief of India Today said, “Farooq’s demand in not 
merely a matter of one disgruntled State. It is significant for it strikes at the absolute 
heart of India's being, indeed questioning the very existence of India the way it has 
been. Devolution of power to the States is inevitable, but autonomy is a far more 
fundamental issue for its implications are enormous. What Farooq wants among other 
things, is that all the symbols of power his state had prior to 1953 be restored. Like the 
Chief Minister being called prime Minister and the Supreme Court having no 
jurisdiction there as stated in the report.7
On the other hand the Jammu and Kashmir government maintained that Jammu 
and Kashmir’s position in the Union of India is unique and no amount of diatribe can 
change it. However, this position was gradually changed through 42nd Constitutional 
orders particularly since 1953 onwards. The state government strongly believed that 
by restoring the original position and giving more powers to Jammu and Kashmir 
there is no danger to the integrity of the country. In fact, removing mistrust and 
fulfilling the regional aspirations will rather strengthen the ties as these would be 
based on mutual trust and fair play, leaving no room for suspicion and consequent 
alienation of the people.8 To remove this trust deficit between the Union Government 
and state of Jammu and Kashmir, It is imperative that India should give due 
consideration to autonomy proposal.
                                               
7India Today, 10 July, 2000. p.28
8 For the details of the State Autonomy Committee Report, refer to, www.JammuKashmir.nic.in
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Chapter 4
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF ALAND AUTONOMY
Aland autonomy has been discussed among scholars because of its precedence 
and substance. Aland autonomy model presents a kind of conflict resolution 
mechanism which led to a win win situation for every party involved. Aland
autonomy is an arrangement of multilateral involvement whose tentacles spread 
outside state sovereignty. Aland autonomy is a territorial autonomy, but it would also 
fit into the notion of cultural autonomy, as the Swedish language and culture 
constitute the autonomy’s foundation. The Aland Islands question is one of the few 
conflicts that have been settled by an international organisation with a durable result. 
The Aland Agreement adopted by the League of Nations in 1921 has been considered 
as one of the most far reaching international guarantees for a national minority ever to 
have been drawn up. It was said that the Alanders should be assured the opportunity of 
arranging their own existence as freely as is possible for a province not constituting an 
independent state. With the passage of time Aland enjoyed their special position more 
than what was provided in the ‘Guarantee Act 1922’. The important aspects of Aland
Autonomy could be classified into three broad headings.
1. Autonomy of Aland Islands in constitutional law of Finland
2. International and supranational character of Aland Autonomy
3. Demilitarization and neutralization of Aland Islands
1. Autonomy of Aland  Islands in constitutional law of Finland
The act in compliance on the Autonomy of Aland, proclaimed on 16 August 1991 
(No.1144), entered into force on 1 January 1993. This is the third autonomy act 
replacing the Autonomy Act of 1951, which in its turn repealed the first Autonomy 
Act given in 1920.1 The Autonomy Act contains basic provisions on the substance of 
                                               
1StenPalmgren,The Autonomy of Åland  Islands in the constitutional law of Finland, in “Autonomy 
and Demilitarization, in International Law: the Aland Islands in a Changing Europe, ed. by 
LauriHannikainen and Frank Horn, The Hague/London/Boston, 1997
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the Autonomy of Aland. The Act sets out not only the limits of the autonomy but also 
basic provisions on the organisation of the legislative and administrative bodies, 
fundamental rights of those possessing the right of domicile, provisions on the 
division of powers between the State and Aland and the economic relationship 
between the State and Aland, as well as provisions on settling disputes between State 
and regional authorities. The Autonomy Act was enacted by the Parliament of Finland 
with the approval of the Alandic Legislative Assembly. It has been published both in 
the Law Gazette of Finland and in the Law Gazette of Aland. Some of the features 
which constitute the whole Autonomy regime of Aland Islands under constitutional 
law of Finland are mentioned below.
(a) The Right of Domicile
The right of domicile emerged as a legal concept in connection with the 1951 
Autonomy Act, though the 1921 League of Nations decision already contained several 
of its elements. As currently constituted it covers the rights to stand for and vote in 
elections to the Aland Parliament, and to acquire real property and conduct business 
activities without special permission. Whoever enjoys the right of domicile, and 
moved to the Islands after the age of twelve, is exempted from military service. A 
child acquires the right of domicile at birth, provided one of its parents possesses that 
right. Immigrants who have five years residence in the Islands for five years and 
satisfactory knowledge of Swedish can obtain the right of domicile by application. 
Anyone who forfeits Finnish citizenship, or moves his or her permanent residence 
from Aland, forfeits the right of domicile. The right of domicile does not constitute 
citizenship, but is rather a form of indigenous right accorded to persons who have 
decided to settle in the Islands. It is based on the ‘Guarantee Act of 1922’, and its 
inclusion in the 1951 Autonomy Act could be considered as compensation for the 
disappearance of the international guarantees.
(b) Language, Culture and Identity
The Aland Islands are ninety four percent Swedish-speaking and form a 
unilingual Swedish speaking province of Finland which recognizes two official 
languages, Finnish and Swedish.  The Aland Islands Swedish language and traditions 
stem from the 650 years of Swedish rule and is strongly protected by the provisions in 
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the Autonomy Act. Swedish is the only official language in use and all State officials 
must know Swedish.  Official letters and other documents sent to Aland by the 
Finnish State must also be in Swedish. Aland has extensive autonomy in the field of 
education.  All teaching in schools receiving public support is in Swedish.  While 
English is a compulsory subject, Finnish is optional only.     
The inhabitants of Aland have a strong sense of identity and when asked 
whether they consider themselves Swedish or Finnish, they will reply that they feel 
like ‘Alanders’. Whether or not they constitute a separate minority from the rest of the 
Swedish-speakers in Finland is a subject to debate. What is certain, however, is that 
the majority of Swedish speakers in Finland live in bilingual municipalities but there 
are also monolingual Swedish municipalities in Ostrobothnia and in the southwest 
near Abo/Turku. A municipality is bilingual when there are at least 8 percent 
Swedish-speaking persons.2Because of their isolation, a strong Alandic identity 
developed which distinguished them from the Swedish speaking population of the 
mainland which, in general, strongly identifies itself with Finland.3With time, the 
Alandic identity has evolved and today many Alanders describe themselves as 
Europeans, Nordic, Finlanders and Alanders.  Most important in protecting the 
specific identity of the Islands is the concept of regional citizenship.  Indeed, it is 
necessary to possess Aland regional citizenship in order to vote and to stand for office 
in the Aland Legislative Assembly, to own and hold real estate and in order to operate 
a business.   In order to acquire regional citizenship one must be a Finnish citizen, 
have resided in the Aland Islands for five years and demonstrate a satisfactory 
knowledge of Swedish. A child may also acquire regional citizenship at birth if one 
parent already possesses it.  Regional citizenship may be withdrawn if a person has 
                                               
2 The Swedish-speaking community of Finland amounts to 295,000 persons or 5.8% of the 
population. Although they are a minority numerically, legally they are not considered as such.  
Linguistic rights are guaranteed in section 17 of the Finnish Constitution (for a text of the new 1999 
Constitution which entered into force on 1 March 2000 (see http://www.vn.fi/vn/english/index.htm) 
and by the 1922 Language Act. 
3Suksi, Markku (1996).  The Åland Islands in Finland, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, pp. 
21-22.
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resided outside of Aland for more than five years.  Aland has national symbols such as 
its own flag (since 1954) and its own postage stamps.  The passports of these ‘Aland
citizens’ bear the mention ‘Aland’.
Almost 5 percent population is of Finnish-speakers in Aland islands and their 
rights have been restricted, although, there are certain concessions to Finnish speakers 
like Finish may be used when  appearing in a court of law or in communication with 
other State officials in Aland, questions have been raised regarding whether Finland  
has violated international human rights conventions because of Aland's provisions 
related to language and education which severely limit the rights of the Finnish 
speakers.4
(c) Evolution of Aland’s Autonomy Regime
More than ninety years of Aland’s autonomous life has not been static. The 
status has evolved over time, in response to arising needs and changing times. After 
thirty years of autonomy governed by the Agreements of 1921, the autonomy of Aland
was expanded through two major revisions to the autonomy act in 1951 and in 1991.  
The first revision was initiated after the Second World War, when a new generation of 
politicians came to power.
A regional movement also developed in Aland during the years 1950-1975 and 
as a consequence national symbols were created—the Aland flag, stamps and a 
national museum. The 1951 Autonomy Act introduced the specific right of domicile 
or ‘regional citizenship’, although elements of it already existed in the previous act.  
In the Autonomy Act of 16 August 1991, which entered into force on 1 January 1993, 
satisfactory knowledge of Swedish as a requirement for regional citizenship was 
added. The other aims of the 1991 revision, enacted with the mutual consent of both 
the Finnish government and the Aland legislative assembly, was to define more 
clearly the legislative competencies of the state and of the provincial authorities to 
                                               
4 Horn Frank, Minorities in Åland with Special Reference to their Educational Rights, in Autonomy 
and Demilitarization in  International Law: the Åland Islands in a Changing Europe,  ed. by 
LauriHannikainen and Frank Horn, The Hague/London/Boston, 1997.
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transfer additional areas of competence to Aland and to provide for the later transfer 
of increased authority in other areas and to expand autonomy in the economic sphere.5
(d) The Governor—the Representative of the Finnish State
Already in the League of Nations decision it was determined that the Governor 
must “enjoy the confidence of the population”. He or she is appointed by the President 
of Finland upon agreement with the Speaker of the Aland Parliament, or if agreement 
cannot be reached, the President must appoint one of five persons nominated by the 
Speaker. The fact that the Alanders can influence Finland’s choice of representative to 
the Islands usually arouses great interest in international fora. Recent Governors have 
even had a background in the Aland administration. 
(e) The Aland Delegation 
The Aland Delegation can be described as an arbitrating /mediating body for 
settling disagreements between Finland and the Aland Islands. It has four members, 
two appointed by the Finnish Government and two by the Aland Parliament. The 
Governor acts as Chairman, and the fact that he or she is appointed after agreement 
between the State and the Speaker of the Parliament becomes important. The 
chairman represents the State, but is a person in whom the Aland authorities have 
confidence. The Aland Delegation should resolve controversies arising in certain 
situations  specified in the Autonomy Act, carry out economic equalization including 
determining the  tax refund, and give extraordinary grants. Any decision to adopt an 
Act of Aland must be delivered to the Aland Delegation, who is to give their opinion 
before it is presented to the President of Finland. Upon request, the Delegation is to 
give opinions to the Council of State, the ministries thereof, Government of Aland and 
courts of law.  
(f) The Aland Government
The fundamental principle of the Autonomy Act is that administrative power is 
to accompany legislative power. In the areas where the Aland Parliament has 
legislative competence, the Aland government exercises administrative power. The 
government is formed according to democratic principles; it must enjoy the 
                                               
5Hannum,Hurst(1993) Documents on Autonomy and MinorityRights. 
Dordrecht/Bostan/London:MartinusNijhoff, p.116.
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confidence of the Aland Parliament. Administration is vested in the government and 
its different organs, officials subordinate to them and the government drafts and 
implements matters relating to the autonomy. It may consist of five to seven members, 
and exercises administration in all the spheres that come under the Autonomy Act.
(g)The Division of Legislative and Administrative Competence 
The present Autonomy Act of Aland came into force in 1993. This Act is of 
exceptionally high standing. Although, it is not called a ‘Constitutional Act’, but is 
legislated by the Parliament of Finland in the same order as the Constitution, and 
cannot be altered or repealed without the assent of the Aland Parliament. This 
legislative order, together with the autonomy’s firm international basis, implies that 
Aland’s autonomy has a very strong constitutional position. The division of legislative 
power between Finland and Aland is in principle exclusive in the sense that a Finnish 
law is not in force in the Islands if Aland has legislative power on the matter, even if 
no Act has been enacted in the Islands, and hierarchically a law of Aland is not 
subordinate to an ordinary law of the Parliament of Finland. The special status that the 
Alandislands enjoy under international law implies that it is a question of division of 
legislative competence between the two parliaments, and not devolution of power by 
one to other. The division of legislative power between the Parliament of Aland and 
that of Finland can be altered only by amending the Autonomy Act through consistent 
decisions of the two Parliaments. In areas where the State has the legislative power, 
the Administration lies under the State officials and where the Parliament of Aland
has the legislative power the administration lies under the government of Aland. 
However, by agreement between the two governments, functions belonging to either 
can be transferred to the other without amending the autonomy Act. 
(h) Legislative Supervision and Settlement of Disputes 
A decision by the Aland Parliament on adoption of an Act shall be delivered to 
the Finnish Ministry of Justice and to the Aland Delegation, which should give its 
opinion to the Ministry before the decision is presented to the President of Finland. He 
may impose a veto, after having obtained an opinion from the Supreme Court, but 
only if the Aland Parliament has exceeded its legislative competence, or if the law 
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affects the external or internal security of the country. If annulment is not ordered 
within four months the law enters into force.
(i) The National Legal Protection of the Autonomy
The Autonomy Act can be amended, explained or repealed only by consistent 
decisions of the Parliament of Finland and the Legislative Assembly of Aland. In 
parliament the decision must be made by a qualified majority, i.e. in the same manner 
as provided for amendments of constitutional acts which is, that in the Legislative 
Assembly of Aland the decision must be made by at least a 2/3 majority of the votes 
cast. As a consequence, the formal legal protection of the Autonomy is extra 
ordinarily strong. The rights given to Aland can never be taken away without the 
consent of a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly.
(j) Aland’s Possibility to Influence State Legislation of Finland
According to Section 22 of the Autonomy Act, the Legislative Assembly of 
Aland may submit initiatives on matters within the legislative power of the State. Such 
initiatives shall be presented to Parliament by the Government of Finland. In these 
cases the Government of Finland has no discretion as to whether to pass a bill or not; 
actually it is no more than a ‘post office’. In principle this is of great importance, 
because the consequence is that Aland has the possibility to bring a matter to 
Parliament even if the Government does not agree. Furthermore, the Autonomy Act 
explicitly stipulates that an opinion shall be obtained from the government of Aland
before the enactment of a law of Parliament, if the law is of special importance to 
Aland. The idea is that special provisions concerning Aland should be included in the 
law, if required by the conditions in Aland. However, special provisions are seldom 
included in laws of Parliament—a matter that often has been regretted by Alandic 
politicians and officials.
(k) Division of Administrative Powers
The administrative power normally follows from the legislative power i.e., in 
the fields of its legislative power Aland also has administrative competence (and bears 
the costs for the administration). Vice versa the State has administrative powers within 
the frames of its legislative power. From this main rule there are certain exceptions. 
The Autonomy Act stipulates several obligations or State and/or Alandic authorities to 
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negotiate with each other before a decision is made. In some cases a decision cannot 
be made without the consent of the other party. The State authorities also have an 
explicit obligation to aid the Alandic officials in administrative matters.  
Taking into account the small size of the Alandic population and 
administration, the described division of administrative powers would be inflexible if 
it did not allow exceptions. Thus, administrative powers can be transferred from 
Alandic authorities to State authorities and vice versa. The means for the transfer is a 
so-called consentaneous decree i.e., a presidential decree issued in agreement with the 
Government of Aland. In other words, a precondition for the transfer of administrative 
powers is a mutual agreement between the Government of Finland and the 
Government of Aland. Legislative powers may never be transferred by a 
consentaneous decree. The only way to transfer legislative powers is to amend the 
Autonomy Act.
(l) The Economic Relations 
As mentioned above, a study of the autonomy of Aland from a legal point of 
view would be incomplete without examining the economic relationships between the 
State and Aland. The starting point is that legislative powers tend to lose significance 
in practice, if they are not combined with a certain economic autonomy. Formal 
competence must in other words be supplemented by economic powers. Otherwise the 
competence will remain only on paper. In this sense the new Autonomy Act of 1991 
radically improves the situation. The former strict State control was abandoned, and 
instead Aland annually receives a certain sum of money called ‘the amount of 
equalization’. This amount is actually not a State subsidy, but rather a consequence of 
the fact that Aland has a very limited power to levy taxes (only municipal and some 
other minor taxes). Thus, the State levies taxes in Aland in the same way as in other 
parts of Finland and these taxes should be returned to Aland in some way—taking into 
account that the State also has direct costs relating to Aland for its local administration 
(for example, customs and border control) and courts, but also for its infrastructure in 
a broader sense (for example, Alanders using the services of central hospitals in 
Finland). 
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The amount of equalization is calculated by multiplying the total State income 
for the year, not including new State loans, as established in the State final accounts, 
by a certain index. This index, called the ‘basis for equalization’, is at present 0.45 per 
cent. The Autonomy Act regulates in detail the preconditions for the alteration of this 
percentage. The Autonomy Act also stipulates possibilities for extra ordinary grants, 
tax retributions and special subsidies.  The main feature of the economic system is that 
the Alandic autonomy, by virtue of law, receives a certain sum every year. 
Fluctuations in the State economy affect the amount, but on the whole the system 
gives a certain economic security. The system has also raised the question whether 
Aland ‘gets more than it pays’ or vice versa. Calculations have been made, but their 
reliability is uncertain. Nevertheless, it seems that in times of stable economy Aland
pays a little bit more to the State than what it receives in equalization. The economic 
system includes the principle that the party having administrative powers shall also 
bear the costs of administration. If administrative tasks are transferred by a 
consentaneous decree, it must therefore also be considered whether the basis for 
equalisation should be altered or whether the costs can be covered in some other 
manner.  In 1992 the Ministry of Justice setup a working group with representatives of 
both the State and Aland to examine the advantages and disadvantages of a potential 
transfer of tax jurisdiction to Aland. The working group's report was given in August 
1994. It includes an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such a transfer, 
but does not give any recommendations. So far it has not led to further action. It seems 
that the State has little interest in transferring tax jurisdiction and is rather afraid of 
creating an Alandic tax haven. The Alanders continuously stress the need for 
diversified tax legislation in Aland and complain that the State does not understand 
the need for special provisions due to different economic realities. For example, Aland
would like to have different provisions concerning the taxation of travel, tourism and 
off-shore activities.
(m) The Judiciary
The jurisdiction in Aland is conducted by State courts, as provided by State 
legislation. The Supreme Court in Helsinki is the highest appellate court. Judicial 
proceedings are regulated by State legislation. In consequence, State courts have the 
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jurisdiction to apply Alandic laws. Appeals in administrative cases may be brought, 
depending on the case, either to the Government of Aland or to the Administrative 
Court of Aland. The Administrative Court of Aland is comparable to the county 
administrative courts in Finland; it is an independent State court. Due to the small 
number of appeals in Aland, however, the Court is organised in cooperation with the 
District Court in Maarianhamina. The appellate court is the Supreme Administrative 
Court in Helsinki. Appeals concerning the legality of a decision of the Government of 
Aland may also be brought directly before the Supreme Administrative Court. 
(n) National Symbols 
National symbols are of great importance to small autonomous areas, as well as 
to newborn states, and they have therefore tended to provoke unnecessary tension 
from time to time. The President of Finland’s right of veto was exercised only once, 
namely when the Aland’s first flag was being adopted. The design chosen was judged 
to resemble the Swedish flag too closely, and “would be likely to cause 
misunderstanding about the status of the region of Aland under constitutional law.” A 
new design was proposed, and the law on an Aland flag was passed in 1954. The flag 
is a blue-yellow-red Nordic flag; it is used in Aland and on Aland’s official buildings, 
and may also be flown on Aland vessels, including merchant ships, fishing and 
pleasure boats, and on comparable vessels based in the Aland Islands. After lengthy 
negotiations Aland first issued its s own postage stamps in 1984, and the postal 
administration was later, through the present Autonomy Act, transferred to the Aland
authorities.  Alanders hold Finnish passports, but since January 1993 the word 
“Aland” has been inserted in passports issued in the Islands to persons with the Right 
of Domicile.
2. International Character of Aland Islands Autonomy
(a) The International Legal basis of the Autonomy
A dispute arose between Sweden and the newly independent Finland over the 
status of the Aland Islands. Sweden called upon Finland to recognize – in respect of 
the principle of self-determination – the right of the Alanders themselves to determine 
their future status. Finland demanded in forceful terms the recognition of its 
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sovereignty over Aland. The two States agreed to the Council’s binding decision. At 
the time of the Council’s decision both State parties to the dispute were members of 
the League of Nations.The League Council’s Decision (Resolution), adopted on 24 
June 1921was favourable to Finland. The Council, being aware of Finland’s de facto
sovereignty over Aland and Finland’s firm behaviour in the dispute, recognized 
Finland’s de jure sovereignty over Aland over the protests of Sweden and Aland. 
During the Council’s handling of the Aland question the Finnish Government 
had suspicions that the Council’s final solution might not be in favour of Finland. To 
improve its chances before the council, in 1920 Finland granted autonomy to Aland in 
a special Autonomy Act (No.124/1920). The Act provided for a Legislative Assembly 
(regional parliament), with limited legislative powers, and a Government for the 
Region of Aland. Swedish was made the sole official language of Aland and was also 
the language of all correspondence between the Aland administration and the State 
authorities. The Alanders rejected the autonomy scheme, but clearly the 1920 
Autonomy Act made a positive impression on the League Council. Notwithstanding 
the 1920 Autonomy Act, the League Council, to appease Sweden and Aland, in its 
Resolution of 24 June 1921 demanded from Finland certain improved guarantees for 
the autonomy and especially for the Swedish character of Aland.
The new guarantees to be inserted in the autonomy laws should specially aim at 
the preservation of the Swedish language in the schools, at the maintenance of the 
landed property in the hands of the Islanders, at the restriction, within reasonable 
limits, of the exercise of the franchise by newcomers, and at ensuring the appointment 
of a Governor who will possess the confidence of the population. The Council 
preferred not to formulate the guarantees in detail. It “recognized that these guarantees 
will be more likely to achieve their purpose, if they are discussed and agreed upon by 
the representatives of Finland with those of Sweden, if necessary, with the assistance 
of the Council”. Should these efforts fail, the Council declared that it would itself fix 
the guarantees. The Council went on to say that, in any case, it would see to the 
enforcement of the guarantees. Indeed, the representatives of Finland and Sweden 
proceeded without delay to negotiate on the formulation of the guarantees dictated by 
the Council. The negotiations were conducted under the chairmanship of a member of 
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the Council, Mr. Hymans from Belgium. Only three days after the adoption of the 
Council's Resolution, on 27 June 1921, Mr. Hymans submitted to the Council the text 
agreed upon by the representatives of Finland and Sweden in which Finland agreed to 
introduce into the Autonomy Act the following guaranties. 
1. Aland is not in any case obliged to support any other schools than those in 
which the language of instruction was Swedish. The Finnish language shall not 
he taught in those primary schools which were supported or subsidized by the 
State or by the communes, without the approval of the commune concerned.
2. If real estate situated in Aland was sold to a person who was not legally 
domiciled in Aland, any person legally domiciled in Aland or the Aland
Government, or the commune in which the estate was situated, had the right to 
redeem the estate. Any dispute between the acquirer and redeemer as to the 
purchase price was to be settled in court.
3. Immigrants to Aland who enjoyed Finnish citizenship could acquire provincial 
and communal franchise in Aland only after five years of legal domicile 
therein. Persons who had been legally domiciled in Aland for five years were 
not to be considered immigrants.
4. The Governor of Aland was to be named by the President of Finland in 
agreement with the President of the Legislative Assembly of Aland.
5. Aland had the right to use for its own needs 50 percent of its revenues of the 
land tax.
6. The League Council had the authority to watch over the application of the 
guarantees. Finland had to forward to the Council, with its observations, any 
claims of the Legislative Assembly of Aland in connection with the application 
of the guarantees. The Council was to consult, in juridical questions, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice.
The League Council approved the text agreed upon by the representatives of 
Finland and Sweden, and decided to annex it to its Resolution of 24 June 1921. Within 
the minority’s protection system of the League of Nations, the protection afforded to 
Aland could be characterized as far reaching. Finland faithfully incorporated the 
provisions of the text of 27 June1921 into its domestic legislation not in the1920 
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Alandic Autonomy Act but in a new Alandic Guarantees Act (No. 189/1922). Both 
the Autonomy Act and the Guarantees Act had a strong status in the constitutional 
system of Finland. These constitutional guarantees of the Acts regulating Aland's 
autonomy have remained in Finnish law and will evidently do so in the future as well. 
In addition, the supervision of the League also extended indirectly to those provisions 
of the autonomy system which were closely connected to the above mentioned 
guarantees. In late autumn of 1921 the Convention on the Demilitarisation and 
Neutralisation of the Aland Islands was concluded by ten interested States under the 
coordination of the League of Nations. After that it could be said that the new status of 
Aland had been established internationally by or at least under the coordination of the 
League of Nations. 
It was the Council of the League which was entrusted with supervising respect 
for Aland’s international status. Aland’s new status proved to be of lasting character. 
It gave something beneficial to all the parties involved: confirmed Finland's 
sovereignty over Aland, gave assurances to Sweden against military action from 
Aland toward Sweden, and created international guarantees in support of Aland's 
autonomy and Swedish character. The Alandic Parliament had the right to send 
complaints to the League Council via the Finnish Government, if it considered that 
Finland had violated the guarantees, but no such complaints were sent by the Alandic 
Parliament in the 1920s or 1930s. Even though the years of the existence of the 
League of Nations have been the most difficult years of Aland’s autonomous  history 
and at the same time nationalistic feelings were quite high in Finland, the Finnish 
Government and the leading organs of Aland were able to settle their disputes without 
the involvement of the Council. Apparently the existence of the guarantees binding 
Finland internationally and the Council's supervisory powers had a moderating effect 
on the Finnish Government.
(b) Aland’s Status after the Collapse of the League of Nations
The League of Nations lost the ability to fulfil its tasks towards the end of the 
1930s. After World War-II the League was replaced by the United Nations (UN) and 
was dissolved in 1946. The League of Nations had supervised a number of 
international arrangements for the protection of minorities. In the post World War II 
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situation it became evident that virtually the entire minorities’ protection system 
supervised by the League had collapsed. The UN did not succeed to the League in this 
matter and assume its supervisory functions. The UN Secretariat published in 1950, 
upon the initiative of the Economic and Social Council, a report on the legal validity 
of the undertakings concerning the protection of minorities placed under the 
supervision of the League of Nations. The conclusion of the report was that the whole 
minorities protection system had ceased to exist because of rebus sic stantibus i.e., a 
fundamental change of circumstances. However, the Report recognized that States 
might have assumed undertakings not only towards the League, but also towards each 
other and that some of the latter obligations might have remained in force. The report 
found one clear example of such an effect in Finland’s obligation towards Sweden to
respect the guarantees concerning Aland, assumed by Finland in 1921.
It was the interpretation of the report that the text presented by Mr Hymans to 
the League Council on 27June1921, as a text agreed upon by the negotiators of 
Finland and Sweden, constituted an agreement binding in international law. The 
Report concluded concerning Aalnd islands that no change of circumstances has 
occurred. The special regime for the Aland Islands concerns particularly Sweden, 
Finland and the population of the Aland Islands. Finland's obligation towards Sweden 
exists till third revision of Autonomy Act.6
The view of the UN Secretariat's Report was similar to that of Sweden, i.e. the 
view assumed by Sweden in the1940s. On the other hand, after the events of 24-27 
June 1921, the negotiators of both parties to the agreement; Finland and Sweden had, 
expressed concurring opinions to a different effect. It had been the opinion of Finland 
that it obligated itself only to the decision of the League Council; the text presented on 
27 June to the Council of the League was only an unofficial common understanding 
between the negotiators of Finland and Sweden. In the process before the Council it 
was Finland's successful policy to exclude Sweden from getting any specific role in 
the supervision of the guarantees. 
                                               
6 See Hannikainen, 1993, pp. 48-52. 
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Regarding Sweden in 1921, one might have expected that Sweden would have 
stressed after the Council's solution that, in its opinion, Finland had assumed 
obligations not only towards the League but also towards Sweden. However, Sweden 
was dismayed by the Council's recognition of Finland's sovereignty over Aland and 
concerned with the bitterness of the Alanders. Sweden did not want to publicly admit 
that it had concluded with Finland a binding agreement expressly confirming its assent 
to the denial of the right of external self-determination of the Alandic people. It was 
better to place the responsibility on the Council. It was the wish of the Swedes that the 
solution reached by the Council in June 1921 would not become the final solution on 
the international status of Aland , Sweden thought that after years the matter would be 
taken up again by the Council for revision. 
Thus the negotiators of Sweden pronounced publicly that Sweden had not 
concluded any binding agreement with Finland. The views of both Finland and 
Sweden that they had not concluded a binding agreement i.e., treaty between 
themselves was also reflected domestically. Neither in Finland nor in Sweden was the 
agreement included in the register of treaties in force. When Finland enacted the1922 
Alandic Guarantees Act, the text presented to the League Council on 27 June was not 
treated as a treaty by Finnish State organs. It was also the view of Finnish legal 
experts that Finland had not concluded a treaty with Sweden.7
Why, then, did Sweden reverse its view in the1940s? When it became evident
that the League of Nations would no longer be able to supervise the respect for 
Aland's international status, Sweden became worried about the fate of Aland. During 
World War-II Finland's independence was in danger and even after the War it was far 
from secure. After having been subjected to a war of aggression by the Soviet Union 
in 1939, Finland became a co-belligerent with Nazi Germany in 1941. In these 
settlement of World War-II Finland was treated as a co-belligerent of the defeated 
Axis powers and was in practice under the heel of the Soviet Union. In Sweden's 
opinion, it would best serve Aland if Sweden emphasized that it had a legal interest in 
speaking for the preservation and respect of Aland's international status. Thus, 
                                               
7 Ibid.
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according to Sweden, there remained in force between Sweden and Finland a binding 
achievement from June 1921, under which Finland had an obligation to Sweden to 
respect Aland's autonomy and Swedish character.
The Alanders supported Sweden's new position, since with the collapse of the 
League of Nations they had lost the possibility to make complaints to an international 
organization. Finland could have contested Sweden's new interpretation and argued 
that with the breakdown of the minorities protection system of the League of Nations, 
Finland's obligations concerning Aland's autonomy and Swedish character ceased to 
exist. However, Finland did not do that but, on the contrary, made it clear that it would 
respect its international obligations.It was in the interest of Finland, which had been 
labelled a co-belligerent of Nazi-Germany and was under pressure from the Soviet 
Union to respect international law, Finland's rights and obligations. It was apparent 
that Finland regarded the decision of the League Council as the basis of its 
obligations. Finland would even have been ready to submit its obligations to a new 
international supervisory system, but the Soviet Union opposed such a scheme. In 
1951 the new Alandic Autonomy Act was enacted in Finland. The new Act enlarged 
and specified the jurisdiction of the Alandic Legislative Assembly.
But the disappearance of the international supervisory system was definitely a 
negative matter for the Alanders. Provisions in the 1951 Autonomy Act enlarged and 
reinforced the autonomy and also preserved the Swedish character of Alandislands as 
compared to the 1921 settlement. After the adoption of the 1951Autonomy Act and 
the partial normalization of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union the Alanders 
could be convinced that their rights were not in jeopardy.
According to the provisions concerning international treaties in the Autonomy 
Act, the Government of Aland may propose negotiations on a treaty with a foreign 
state. Furthermore, the Aland Government must be informed of negotiations on a 
treaty with a foreign state if the matter is subject to its competence and may even 
participate in the negotiations (section 58).  If Finland contracts an international treaty 
which contains a provision coming under the sphere of competence of Aland, then the 
consent of the Lagting is required for the treaty to apply to Aland as well (section 59). 
Thus, because part of the legislative power of the Finnish State and of Aland had to be 
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transferred to EU institutions, the consent of Aland had to be obtained through 
referendum before Finland joined the European Union in 1995.  The 1991 Autonomy 
Act was also amended to include a new chapter on the participation of Aland in EU 
matters. Certain exemptions were decided and were included in a separate protocol to 
the accession treaty.8
(c) The Aland Island in the Nordic Council
The Nordic Council is an organisation for regional cooperation. It concentrates 
its sphere of activities mainly on legal, cultural, social and economic issues. The 
cooperation also covers communications and environmental protection. The Nordic 
Council has existed since 1952, though in the beginning it was an informal 
organisation with only four members: Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Fin 
land joined the organisation in 1955, and in 1962 the Helsinki Agreement on 
Cooperation between the Nordic Countries was signed.The Nordic Council's 
Parliamentary Assembly consists of 87 deputies. It is the main decision-making organ 
of the Nordic Council. Usually, a reference to the Nordic Council refers in reality to 
its Parliamentary Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly adopts recommendations. 
In 1970 the Faroe Islands and the Aland Islands entered the Nordic Council. The 
Faroe Islands was given two seats and the Aland Islands one In the Parliamentary 
Assembly. In 1983, when Greenland entered the Nordic Council, Aland was given an 
additional seat. So, presently Aland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland each have two 
seats out of the total of eighty seven (87) seats in the Nordic Council. Only these 87 
members have a vote in the Parliamentary Assembly. The representatives of the State 
governments and the governments of Aland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland also 
participate in sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly. These governmental 
representatives are not entitled to vote, but they have a right to forward proposals to 
the Parliamentary Assembly. Thus, Aland participates in the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Nordic Council both through its two deputies as well as through the 
representatives from the Government of Aland.
                                               
8Suksi, Markku (1996).  The Aland Islands in Finland, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, pp. 
32-36.
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Another organ of the Nordic Council is the Council of Ministers, in which each 
State has one vote. The autonomous regions are not members of the Council of 
Ministers. They are entitled, however, to have representatives attending the sessions of 
the Council of Ministers, and they also have the right to speak during these sessions. 
The Prime Ministers of the Nordic Council meet regularly, usually in 
connection with the annual sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly. These meetings 
are not formalised, and the group of Prime Ministers is not a formal organ of the 
Nordic Council. In reality, however, the meetings of Prime Ministers are quite 
important as they are the forum for top-level co-ordination of Nordic policies. During 
the meeting of Prime Ministers in March 1994, the autonomous regions forwarded the 
idea that they should have the right to make proposals and suggestions directly to the 
meetings of Prime Ministers. The initial reaction of the Prime Ministers has been very 
positive. Participation in the Nordic Council has been a high priority for the Aland
Islands. The Legislative Assembly and Government of the Islands is firm in their 
belief that this is the best forum for Aland's ‘international voice’. For Aland the 
Nordic Council has, until now, been regarded as the best platform for maintaining the 
Alandic issue as an issue of international concern.
(d) Aland islands and the European Union
In 1992 Finland applied for membership in the European Communities 
(subsequently embraced by the European Union). Although Aland was not a formal 
party during the accession negotiations, its autonomy still came into play in a 
significant way. It was clear that even if Finland decided to join, Aland had the right 
to remain essentially outside. This is based on the Autonomy Act, which states that 
international agreements signed by Finland and affecting Aland’s autonomy must be 
approved by the Alandic Legislative Assembly if the agreement is to come into force 
in the Islands. Therefore, Finland had to take into account the demands for 
derogations made by Aland to protect its constitutional and economic interests. 
Aland’s representatives took part in the negotiations as part of the Finnish delegation, 
as provided for in the Autonomy Act. Great efforts were required in defining and 
defending the negotiating position on Aland’s status. The hard work bore fruit. Aland
was in substance more or less granted all derogations requested. Therefore, it was 
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hardly surprising that Aland eventually decided to join the European Union together 
with Finland.
After Finland’s national referendum, in which 57% of the voters were in favour 
of Finland’s membership in the European Union, a separate regional referendum was 
arranged in Aland. A resounding majority of the Alanders almost 74 percent voted in 
favour of following Finland and Sweden into the Union. The Alandic Legislative 
Assembly sealed Aland’s accession to the EU.The Alanders knew that life within the 
EU would not be easy. On the other hand, they felt instinctively that life outside the 
Union, with both Finland and Sweden inside, might be even harder. Even if the terms 
of Aland’s accession may not be optimal, most Alanders feel that it is possible to live 
with them. Aland’s participation in the negotiations and the separate referendum lend 
a strong element of legitimacy to the Legislative Assembly’s ultimate decision to 
accede to the Union. 
3. Demilitarisation and Neutralisation:
The special status of the Aland Islands rests on two main pillars: 
demilitarization and neutralization on the one hand, and political and cultural 
autonomy on the other. Of these two pillars, demilitarization and neutralization has a 
longer and more unequivocal standing under public international law. The Alanders 
themselves have never been and will never become a threat to anyone. It is the 
strategic geographical position of the islands that constitutes the threat.This is why 
Sweden requested that the Aland question be considered during the German-Russian 
peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the later phase of World War I. From the 
Swedish point of views, the 1856 Convention was considered unsatisfactory, because 
the demilitarization of the Islands did not guarantee their neutrality, which was and 
still is, the main goal of Sweden concerning the status of Aland.The situation was 
confusing, who should negotiate with whom? Was the Aland question to be dealt with 
by Bolshevik Russia or by the new Republic of Finland? Sweden did not participate in 
the peace negotiations. Germany was not interested in the neutralization of the Islands. 
There were still Russian Troops and military installations on the Aland Islands, 
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contrary to the stipulations of the Aland Island’s Servitude, a solution with two steps 
was inserted into Article 6 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918.
1. The Islands were to be cleared of Russian troops and Russian Red Guard, and 
the military installations built during the war were to be dismantled as soon as 
possible.
2. Concerning the permanent non-fortification of the Aland Islands and the 
prevention of their further use for military purposes, a special treaty was to be 
concluded between Germany, Finland, Russia and Sweden. Other States were 
to be invited to participate in the planned treaty.
The above mentioned decision of the Council of the League of Nations in June 
1921 on the Aland Islands called for the replacement of the 1856 Convention by a 
broader convention which would both demilitarize and neutralize the Islands. Despite 
strong protests from Soviet Russia, a special conference was convened in Geneva in 
October 1921. The States mentioned above, together with Estonia, France, Great 
Britain, Italy, Latvia and Poland, but not Russia, took part in order to draft and sign a 
Convention on the Demilitarization and Neutralization of the Aland Islands.All 
participants in the Conference signed the Convention after its adoption on 20 October 
1921. The Convention came into force in 1922. 
In view of the unstable political situation in Central Europe at the end of the 
1930s, Finland drafted a plan to amend the 1921 Convention in order to improve the 
possibilities to defend the Aland  Islands against possible occupation by a third 
country, in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention. The Convention was not 
amended, however, because of the opposition of the Soviet Union, in 1939 the so-
called Winter War broke out between the Soviet Union and Finland. The termination 
of this war resulted in a treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1940 on the 
demilitarization of the Aland Islands which did not affect the 1921 Convention. In this 
way the Soviet Union became a party to the demilitarization regime of the Aland
Islands.
In 1941 war broke out again between Finland and the Soviet Union. The 
League of Nations had lost its significance and Finland had to defend the Islands, 
however, they were not attacked. In the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, which sealed the 
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termination of war in the battlefields, but did not put an end to ideological war, 
Finland, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and other countries reaffirmed that “the 
Aland Islands remain demilitarized according to the present situation”.
The Soviet Union does not exist anymore. However, the new Russian Federation has 
recognized the existence of the treaties and conventions concerning the status of the 
Aland Islands to which the Soviet Union was a party. The special status of the Aland
Islands in international law has been recognized by the European Union in its 
negotiations with Finland.
According to the Autonomy Act of Aland, Alanders are the subject in matters 
affecting the autonomy. What about the demilitarization and neutralization are the 
Alanders a subject regarding this part of Aland’s status? The Alanders themselves 
regard this status as part of their autonomous arrangement, but the Finnish Military 
Forces do not. Finnish politicians have a more diplomatic approach and show 
understanding when Alanders express their opinions on the practical interpretation of 
the conventions and treaties concerned. There is an ongoing discussion between the 
Alandic administration and the State authorities on the correct application of the terms 
of the demilitarization and neutralization. The people of Aland also play a role in the 
monitoring of respect for the demilitarization. 
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Chapter 5
KASHMIR AND ALAND: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF AUTONOMY 
MODELS
             It is important to understand that autonomy is a relative term that can only be 
understood within a larger context of complex authority relations. Rather than 
signifying the minimum level of independence of a particular entity, autonomy is 
about the extent of dependence or interdependence of an entity be it political, 
economic, cultural vis-à-vis other entities.  Autonomy also has both territorial and 
non-territorial dimensions. With regards to the former, autonomy may refer to the 
state delegation of administrative and or legislative powers to institutions representing 
a population inhabiting a geographically well-defined area within a state. Criteria for 
the possession of ‘full autonomy’ may include a locally elected body with independent 
legislative powers, a locally chosen chief executive and independent local judiciary.1
Non- territorial forms of autonomy are more difficult to characterize, but generally 
apply to members of a group that are dispersed across a State whose characteristics 
diverge from the majority of the state’s population.2 Clearly, autonomy is therefore 
evoked in a variety of ways, which has led some scholars to argue that the term is so 
‘hopelessly confused’ as to confound any conceptual value. However, the ability of 
the concept to cover so many institutional arrangements could also be perceived as a 
strength and it may be invoked on an adhoc basis in any situation that requires it.3
The majority of definitions of autonomy in the social sciences are framed in 
terms of states and self-determination.4 This echoes the legal interpretation of 
constitutional autonomy, which implies sovereign state’s independence or the 
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constitutional recognition of autonomy within an existing state. Given this 
understanding, autonomy either belongs to the state (attributed to the capacity of a 
state to exert power) or autonomy is negotiated within a state (arising from the 
decision of a state to allocate a degree of self-government to one or more of its 
constituent parts).The latter understanding is the most prevalent in the literature. 
According to Lapidoth, a leading authority on this concept, autonomy is a ‘means for 
diffusion of powers in order to preserve the unity of a state while respecting the 
diversity of its population, it has been successful in some cases and failed in others.’ 
As such, the concept of autonomy is often defined as constituting a number of 
different constitutional arrangements that include federalism, confederalism, 
decentralization, associate statehood and devolution.5 The decision to create autonomy 
arrangements is often based on the notion that national cultures are largely 
incongruent with sovereign states and that some territorial or cultural communities 
should have the right to limited control over their own affairs. Thus, autonomy implies 
a way of devolving authority to a lower level, but maintaining the state’s territorial 
integrity. Let us now turn to a particular type of autonomy: that of Aland Islands. It is 
clear that the Aland Islands have developed some of the most creative and 
asymmetrical forms of autonomy within a larger state and supranational structures, 
which encourages further examination by comparing it with a different context like 
Kashmir.
Over the years, many analysts and political scientists have proposed different 
proposals and models for resolving the Kashmir conflict. One such model suggests 
granting the Jammu and Kashmir region a similar status as of the Aland Islands of 
Finland. The Aland Islands status within Finland seems to be suitable for addressing 
the demands of the people of Jammu and Kashmir for self-governance and India’s 
pre-condition of ‘not redrawing of boarders’ and ‘within pillars of Indian 
constitution’. In such a situation this could be one of the most optimal and feasible 
solutions to the question of political status of Jammu and Kashmir state. As the 
autonomy of both Kashmir and Aland islands has been analysed in previous chapters, 
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it now is less complicated to compare them. Both these autonomies posses many 
features which are similar and also there are features which are different too. The two 
have been compared in the sections below on a point to point basis considering one 
feature at a time.                                                                       
Geostrategic Position
Jammu and Kashmir is the Northern most state of India. To its north lie China 
and Russia, on its east is Chinese Tibet, on the south and south‐west lie the Indian 
states of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh and in the west is the North West Frontier 
Provinces of Pakistan, China and Russia. The state of Jammu and Kashmir consists of 
three divisions Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh with their own ethnic 
composition. The different parts of Jammu and Kashmir as we know before 1947, is 
presently in possession of India, Pakistan and China. Because of its geostrategic 
location, after World War II most of the world powers had their eye on Kashmir. The 
leadership in Kashmir from the beginning was ideologically influenced by Russian 
socialism and adding to it the geographical proximity of the J&K state with Soviet 
Union did not auger well with western powers; they obtained their ally in the form of 
Pakistan. The involvement of foreign powers in the Kashmir dispute had its impact on 
the events which unfolded afterwards.
Pertinently, Aland Islands in a similar setup is located between Sweden and 
Finland at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea. Like Jammu and 
Kashmir, the Aland Islands have been a subject of geopolitical game by various 
powers over centuries due to their strategic location. In 1714, the region was occupied, 
albeit for a short time, by Russia under Peter the Great. During the consecutive years, 
Russia and Sweden fought several wars for the control of the region, which changed 
hands from one side to the other in the process. Only after the 1808-1809 military 
campaign, Russia finally managed to control the Aland Islands and other Finnish 
territories that were under Swedish control at that time. Prominent writer James 
Barros depicts the Swedish negotiators who “vainly insisted upon the fact that the 
Aland Islands has never been anything other than a Swedish province” to which 
Russian commissioners replied, “We are not concerned with old Swedish frontiers, 
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but with new Russian frontier.”6 In another account Barros states, “having used the 
Aland Islands as a military base against the Swedes, the Russians were aware of their 
strategic importance, not only for the defence of Finland but also for control of the 
Baltic, especially domination of the Gulf of Bothnia”.7 Strategic location of both 
Aland and Kashmir has linked their destinies and political future with the powers 
around whom they were historically linked. Since 1921 the Aland zone has been 
delineated by a system of coordinates enumerated in a convention of 1921 on the 
demilitarization and neutralization of the Aland Islands. An international strait, South 
Quarken, between the Aland Islands and Sweden forms the passageway between the 
Baltic Sea proper and the Gulf of Bothnia. The shipping route passes through Swedish 
territorial waters between two small islets; Understen on the Swedish side, and 
Marketrock, which is divided between the Alands (Finland) and Sweden. Thus, in 
geostrategic position both Aland and Kashmir are in a similar setting and of strategic 
importance to its neighbours.8
Nature of Conflicts
The conflict history of both Aland Islands and Kashmir regions are 
comparable on the grounds that both regions have been contested by different powers 
at different points of time. Both these conflicts have been referred to international 
organizations and have been mediated although, with varied results. As for as internal 
dimension of these conflicts within the Finish and Indian limits are concerned 
autonomy or special status, within the parameters of  Finish and Indian Constitution 
,were proposed to meet  the demands of the people and or for conflict resolution. 
These along with other factors portrays that the nature of conflict appeared more or 
less similar.
The problem of Kashmir as it emerged shortly after the independence of India 
was in many ways a by product of political complexity, that the subcontinent had 
undergone during the colonial period, which culminated in its division. With the lapse 
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8 A.G. Noorani, 2005, January 15-28.The Alands Model. Frontline, 22-2.
67
of British paramountcy, Princely states including the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
were asked to choose between the two dominions; India and Pakistan. Several factors 
were responsible in complicating the context in Kashmir.  One that the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir in its geo-ethnic structure was heterogeneous and diverse with divergent 
political orientations and aspirations, Secondly the situation, in which partition took 
place, created political uncertainty within and outside state. The Maharaja found it 
difficult to decide in favour of the either side. During the crucial years proceeding 
1947 there were different types of forces within the state operating for divergent 
political ends. There were forces active for Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan and forces 
that wanted Kashmir to accede to India. In addition, there has always been strong 
opinion in favour of Kashmir remaining independent. However, none of the forces had 
an easy choice because of various checks and balances operating from within and 
outside. Maharaja Hari Singh failed to take a prompt decision about the future shape 
of his state, It is only after being confronted by a compelling situation created as a 
result of the tribal entry into the state that he acceded to the Indian dominion by 
signing the instrument of accession on 26 October 1947.Under the instrument of 
accession, powers concerning Defence, External Affairs and Communication were 
transferred to the Indian dominion. Maharaja clarified in the instrument that, “nothing 
in the instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to the acceptance of any 
future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with 
the government of India under any such constitution.” The National Conference 
Leaders while endorsing the accession did not want the quantum of accession to 
exceed the items which had been transferred to dominion government under the 
instrument of accession. Negotiations on the provisions in the proposed constitution of 
India in relation to the Jammu and Kashmir state’s membership of union began when 
a meeting of leaders of the national conference and of the central leadership was held 
in Delhi on March 15 and 16, 1949. After hectic negotiations the state was then 
accorded a special status under article 370 of the Indian constitution. So, it is evident 
that the nature of conflict was such that it had an internal and an external dimension. 
Externally it was contested by India and Pakistan and internally there was a deep 
cleavage in relations between the Indian Union and the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
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In a similar pattern in case of Aland Islands, by the Peace Treaty signed at 
Fredrikshamn on 17 September 1809, Sweden ceded to Russia, Finland as well as the 
Aland Islands. Russia governed them as part of an autonomous Grand Duchy of 
Finland till 1917 and it imposed sheer despotic rule. The Russian Revolution of March 
1917 put an end to it and on 7 November 1917, came the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Under its influence on 15 November 1917, the Soviet government published a 
declaration on the rights of foreign peoples to self-determination. Events moved at a 
breathless pace in those revolutionary times and Finland's senate declared the country 
an independent republic on 6 December 1917 with the Soviet regime promptly 
recognizing it on 2 January 1918. Alanders did not watch these events as passive 
spectators. On 20 August 1917, representatives of all the districts of Aland held a 
secret meeting at the Aland Folk High School at Finstrom where they decided to work 
for a reunion of Aland with Sweden. This wish was conveyed to the King and 
Government of Sweden by four elected Aland representatives by a petition signed by 
96 percent of Alanders of legally competent age. They also elected an unofficial 
legislature in 1918, to pursue the goal of reunion with Sweden. It was an impressive 
demonstration of the popular will. In total 7,135 persons signed the address from 20-
25 December 1917, which was presented to the King of Sweden on 3 February 1918. 
In June 1919 in an unofficial plebiscite around 95 percent of the people voted for
unification with Sweden. Finland pinpointed procedural flaws in both the exercises, 
but the nature of the popular verdict was unmistakable. Alanders appealed to the U.S., 
Britain and France and sent a delegation to the Peace Conference at Versailles and to 
the League of Nations in July 1920. They setup a legislature ‘the Landsting’, 
comprising delegates from the municipal councils. After unsuccessful exploratory 
soundings, Sweden formally took up the matter with Finland in November 1918, 
asking for a plebiscite. It received a snub in June 1919 in the form of two moves 
which Finland made, one adroit and the other clumsy. 9 Its Parliament enacted, on 6 
May 1920, an Autonomy Law for the Alands to fortify its case before world opinion. 
Prime Minister Rafael Erich, with two colleagues, went to the Alands' capital, 
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Mariehamn, to explain the law and persuade delegates of the communes to accept it. 
Their leader Julius Sundblom replied, on behalf of the Landsting, that they would not 
renounce their demand for a plebiscite. It was an angry encounter. On the following 
day, 5 June 1920, Sundblom and the President of the Landsting, Carl Bjorkman, were 
arrested for high treason and taken to Abo in Finland as they had been to Sweden 
earlier to seek its support. The arrest of Sundblom and Carl Bjorkman in Aland was 
relatively similar to the arrests of Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beigh in Kashmir. 
These arrests in Aland and in Kashmir by the Finish and the Indian governments 
respectively served in a negative way by enhancing the sense of betrayal and 
alienation among common masses.
Role of International Organizations
The Aland dispute acquired a new shape and format that facilitated its 
solution. On 12 June 1920, the acting British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, wrote to 
Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations "in exercise of 
the friendly right conferred by Article XI of the Covenant of the League of Nations to 
bring to the attention of the Council of the League the case of the Aland Islands, as a 
matter affecting international relations which unfortunately threatens to disturb the 
good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." He had informed 
the Governments of Sweden and Finland of his intention to move the League. The 
Council had nine members consisting of the five Great Powers and four others elected 
by the Assembly as non-permanent members. In case of Kashmir, Britain might well 
have made a similar friendly move in 1947 in order to avert a war between India and 
Pakistan, but that was not done. Mountbatten mooted the idea to both, Nehru and 
Liaquat Ali Khan on 8 December 1947, doubtless, with London's backing and his 
proposal was to ask the U.N. “to send out observers or advisers” to help “solve the 
impasse” over a draft agreement which V.P. Menon and Mohammed Ali had drawn 
up. Why not "a joint approach to UNO"? He asked, Liaquat agreed. Nehru rejected it 
"entirely". He "asked under what section (sic.) Of the Charter any reference to UNO 
could be made." The U.N. could come in only after the raiders were driven out, he 
said. By 22 December, Nehru had decided to refer to the U.N. Pakistan's complicity in 
the tribesmen's raid into Kashmir. But the appeal was made, not under Chapter VII of 
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the U.N. Charter “acts of aggression” but under Chapter VI "pacific settlement of 
disputes". The draft was thoroughly vetted by M.C. Setalvad, one of the foremost 
lawyers in India, Nehru's letter to him, on 20 December; itself predicted that the 
Security Council might appoint a commission, which it did. Setalvad explicitly 
warned Nehru and others that the whole scheme of the Charter was that the Security 
Council should try and bring about a solution of the disputes between nations by 
mediation and other measures.  Mountbatten feared that if Uri fell to the raiders, they 
would move towards Baramula and Srinagar, driving Nehru to attack West Punjab. It 
was a stark choice between the U.N.'s mediation and an all-out war. India opted for 
the former, consciously. If war had broken out, mediation wouldhave followed under 
duress.10
Concerning Aland Islands, the council of the League of Nations met in the 
glittering St. James Palace in London on 9 July 1920. The meeting had representatives 
of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain, US had already 
opted out of the League. Finland was represented by Enckall and Sweden by Branting. 
Branting argued by tracing the history of the islands and concluded by urging that they 
be conceded the right of self-determination. Enckall countered by arguing that there 
was ‘no war or threat of war’ to warrant the Council’s intervention and it was, in any 
case, barred from doing so because the dispute arises out of a matter which by 
international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Alands' 
representative also submitted a statement to the Council. He pleaded for a plebiscite 
on  the question of joining Sweden. Branting responded thus; "The inhabitants of the 
Aland Islands shall be permitted to decide immediately by plebiscite whether the 
Aland archipelago shall remain under Finnish sovereignty or be reunited with the 
Swedish Kingdom?"  On 12 July, Balfour read a Declaration on behalf of the Council, 
which both sides accepted and which read that before trying to settle the dispute, the 
preliminary issue of domestic jurisdiction must be settled. Since the Permanent Court 
of International Justice had not yet been established at Hague to give its advisory 
opinion, the Council sought an opinion from a Commission of three international 
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jurists. It resolved, unanimously, with the consent of both parties, to seek an advisory 
opinion from the jurists on two questions: on the domestic jurisdiction and on the 
present state of the international obligations regarding the demilitarization of the 
Aland Islands.11
The President appointed three jurists: F. Laurande of France, Max Huber of 
Switzerland and A. Struycken from Netherlands. The Commission of Jurists submitted 
its report on September 5, 1920 after hearing all the three parties. It held that the right 
to self-determination was not inscribed in the Covenant of the League nor was it a rule 
of international law. Cession of territory was a sovereign right in the state's discretion 
and others cannot demand it. In this regard, the Alands case differed fundamentally 
from Kashmir situation. India had pledged itself to hold a plebiscite on 31 October 
1947, to the people of Kashmir and to the world. The pledge was incorporated in two 
resolutions of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, dated 13 August 1948, and 
5 January 1949. Both countries accepted them and Krishna Menon correctly 
characterized them in the UN Security Council on 8 February 1957 as India's 
"international engagements.........we have entered into." It is on the basis of these 
engagements that the Constituent Assembly adopted Article 370 of the Constitution of 
India on 17 October, 1949. Its mover, Sir N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, explicitly 
referred to ‘the Kashmir problem’ before the UN and to India's commitment "that an 
opportunity would be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves 
whether they will remain with the republic of India or wish to go out of it. We are also 
committed to ascertaining this will of the people by means of a plebiscite."12 Article 
370 is based on this pledge and provides in clause (3) for its own extinction (‘cease to 
be operative’) and thereby severance of the link between the State and the Union if the 
plebiscite's verdict went against India. That was the only way Kashmir could have 
constitutionally seceded from India. Plebiscite was official Indian policy from 1947 to 
1954. It was part of the process of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. It is 
another matter that by mid-1948 Nehru had privately resolved not to hold a plebiscite 
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and in 1965 Pakistan disentitled itself from demanding it by launching a war in 
Kashmir. Finland on the other side never made any such pledge in respect of the 
Alands. Its neighbour demanded a plebiscite, in what in law was Finnish territory, on 
grounds of ethnic and linguistic affinity. The world community was alive to the 
consequence, if this principle was accepted in respect of minorities occupying a 
compact area adjoining another state with which they had affinities, linguistic, ethnic 
or religious. The Jurists' Report noted that the people of Finland and of the Alands had 
"totally different aspirations", though they acted in unison in their separation from 
Russia. The dispute arose out of a certain situation at the end of the First World War 
"and finds its source in the separatist demonstrations of the people invoking the 
principle of self-determination". It therefore, did not relate to a matter, which in 
international law came exclusively within Finland's domestic jurisdiction. An 
important principle was laid down that an international dispute of this kind did not 
become a domestic matter because secession was ruled out. It had to be settled by an 
international agreement and it cannot be settled unilaterally. 
On the second issue pertaining to demilitarization, the Report recalled the 
convention, which Britain, France and Russia signed in Paris on 30 March, 1856, 
declaring that "no military or naval establishment will be maintained nor set up on the 
Islands". It was annexed to the Peace Treaty signed after the Crimean War. It 
remained valid despite its breaches during the First World War. The report, thus, put 
the ball back in the Council's court. Its jurisdiction upheld by the Council decided, on 
20 September 1920, to set up a Commission of Rapporteurs "to recommend the 
solution which it considered the most equitable and most appropriate to the question". 
The rapporteurs were Felix Calonder, B. Beyens and Abram J. Elkus. Their report, 
submitted on 16 April, 1921 is a masterly document, even if some of its formulations 
may not be appropriate. It carefully traced the history of the islands and closely 
analysed the issues involved. The report charted the path that led to a settlement 
eventually. The Rapporteurs agreed with the jurists on the issue of domestic 
jurisdiction as also on the Alanders' manifest desire for union with Sweden. But they 
had been part of Finland and could not claim secession, as Finland did for itself. The 
rapporteurs also emphasized that there is another consideration which excludes the 
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analogy which it is wished to establish between the Finnish people and the Aland 
population. Finland has been oppressed and persecuted and her tenderest feelings have 
been wounded by the disloyal and brutal conduct of Russia. The Alanders have neither 
been persecuted nor oppressed by Finland and the separation of a minority from the 
state of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another state can only be 
considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks 
either the will or the power to enact and apply just guarantees. In case of the Alanders, 
it was accepted that the important question is the protection of their language - the 
Swedish language and it was said that its language is the very soul of a people and if it 
were true that incorporation with Sweden was the only means of preserving its 
Swedish language for Aland we would not have hesitated to consider this solution but 
such is not the case.
Demilitarization and Militarization
The AlandIslands form in many ways an interesting case in European security 
policy and in the gradually evolving European security system. Owing to its location, 
Aland has for centuries been of great strategic interest for states in its neighbourhood. 
When Finland—and Aland with it—were transferred from Sweden to the Russian 
Empire in 1809, Sweden started to push for the demilitarization of Aland. After the 
1854–56 Crimean War, during which  major operations took place on Aland, an 
appendix to the 1856 Treaty of Paris  forbade Russia from establishing fortifications 
or maintaining or building up a  military presence and naval forces on the islands.13
After Finland gained independence from Russia in 1917, Aland became for a 
number of years a source of controversy between Finland and Sweden as a result of 
the Alanders’ demand for Aland’s reunification with Sweden.  In the summer of 1921 
the League of Nations resolved the Aland question and maintained that Aland should 
remain a part of Finland but would be granted autonomy, which along with the 
historically rooted principles of neutrality and demilitarization would be supported by 
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international guarantees. In October 1921 the Convention relating to the Non-
fortification and Neutralization of the Aland Islands was signed by Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Russia was not accepted as a party to the convention because the Western powers did 
not regard Bolshevik Russia as a sovereign state after the revolution of 1917. Under 
the demilitarization provisions of the Aland Convention, Finland confirmed its 
commitments in the 1856 treaty.14 The 1921 convention prohibits the building or 
maintenance of any military, naval or air force installations or bases of operation on 
the islands as well as any other installations intended for military purposes.15
The Aland Convention also contains provisions on the neutralization of the 
territory in case of war and states that it may not, directly or indirectly, be used for 
military purposes. The legal international basis of demilitarized and neutralized status 
of the Islands which is considered part of their autonomous arrangement is found in 
the 24 June Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations. According to the 
second paragraph of the Resolution, “the interests of the world, the future of cordial 
relations between Finland and Sweden, the prosperity and happiness of the Islands 
themselves cannot be ensured unless (a) certain further guarantees are given for the 
protection of the Islanders; and unless (b) arrangements are concluded for the non-
fortification and neutralization of the Archipelago”.
As a matter of fact, the above mentioned sentences gather together the 
institutions of autonomy and military status, which would be part of the “indivisible 
trinity” of Aland’s status.16  In addition, it also mentions together all the interests 
protected by the Resolution (cordial relations, prosperity, happiness) and all the 
subjects which might be said to hold those interests, so that one might think that each 
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of the subjects mentioned in it – that is Finland, Sweden, Aland and even the whole 
world – had a legal interest both in the recognition of the Islands’ autonomy and their 
demilitarization. Alanders had never sought the demilitarization of their Archipelago, 
but only its reunion with Sweden. 
To start with the autonomy, the relevant provisions are the third and fourth paragraphs 
of the Resolution. According to the fourth paragraph, the Autonomy Act of 1920 had 
to be supplemented so as to include provisions aimed “at the preservation of the 
Swedish language in the schools, at the maintenance of the landed property in the 
hands of the Islanders, at the restriction, within reasonable limits, of the exercise of 
the franchise by new comers, and at ensuring the appointment of a Governor who will 
possess the confidence of the population”. On the other hand, the demilitarization of 
the Islands is based on the fifth paragraph of the decision, according to which “an 
international agreement in respect of the non-fortification and the neutralization of the 
Archipelago should guarantee to the Swedish people and to all the countries 
concerned, that the Aland Islands will never become a source of danger from the 
military point of view”. This way the demilitarization of the Aland Islands has become 
an integral part of its autonomous character and also has ensured a peaceful resolution 
of the dispute. So, it can be said that demilitarization is a pre-requisite and a factor in 
making the autonomy regime successful in any region.
In case of Kashmir, the first war between India and Pakistan began in October 
1947 and ended in December 1948. The origins of the first war between India and 
Pakistan can be traced to the final status of Kashmir following the establishment of an 
independent India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947. British policy held that the 
various princely states would have to accede to either Pakistan or India based on 
geographic location and on demographics. While the final status of many of the states 
was easily concluded, Kashmir and two other states posed special problems. Tensions 
between Pakistan and the government of Kashmir grew as the Maharaja's indecision 
frustrated Pakistan and pro-Pakistani factions within Kashmir. Hostilities began in 
early October 1947 when a tribal rebellion broke out in Poonch in southwest Kashmir. 
By October 20th the Pakistani Army entered the conflict in support of the tribal forces 
in a multi-pronged effort designed to capture Uri, Jhangar, Rajuara, and Naushera in 
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the opening days of the campaign. The Maharaja, facing overwhelming odds and near 
certain defeat, asked India for military support. India agreed to help provided that 
Kashmir acceded to India and that the Prime Minister of Kashmir endorsed the 
accession. Both the Maharaja and the Prime Minister agreed to these terms and on 26 
October the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession. The post partition events 
shaped up in such a way which brought both Indian and Pakistani military in 
Kashmir.Led by Britain and the United States, the U.N Security Council passed  a 
resolution (Resolution 47) on 21 April 1948, which enlarged the membership of the 
UNCIP from 3 to 5 and called for cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan, 
withdrawal of all Pakistani troops and tribesmen and bulk of Indian troops(except for 
a minimal number required for maintaining law and order), allowing return of 
refugees, release of political prisoners and holding of a UN supervised Plebiscite in 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir to determine the aspirations of her people. The 
Plebiscite was to be held by a UN appointed Plebiscite administrator. Unfortunately, 
the whole case shaped contradictory to what happened to Aland Islands in the League 
of Nations. Neither the force withdrawal nor the plebiscite has taken place in the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. Since then the Kashmir issue remained alive and the process 
of militarization continued. With the rise of militancy in 1990 there were about 
150,000 soldiers stationed in Kashmir, i.e. about 17 soldiers per square mile and one 
soldier for every 17 civilians. Subsequently, an independent estimate in 1994 put the 
soldiers’ number in Kashmir to 400,000 which represented just under half or 44 
percent of the total Indian army at that time. In 2004, this number was estimated 
between 500,000 to 700,000 or one soldier for every 10 civilians. The former Deputy 
Chief Minister of the state informed the state assembly in 2006 that there were more 
than 667,000 forces personnel in the state for a population of 12 million. In 2007, the 
army sources gave the figure of 3, 37,000; one trooper for every 18 persons. In this 
way Kashmir was made the “most heavily militarized zone” in the world. It was 
essentially in this context that the U.S. State Department’s top official characterized 
Kashmir as the “most dangerous spot in the world”.
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Institutional Mechanism 
The purpose of this comparative analysis is not to apply legal labels used for 
the definition of the relationship between other autonomous regions and the respective 
central government. Legal definitions like “federalism” or “regionalism” are very 
vague and do not help understanding complex legal phenomena, mostly when there is 
no agreement among legal scholars even on the basic elements of these definitions. 
Moreover, even identical institutions might have very different developments 
depending on practical circumstances and political attitudes in the different 
constitutional systems.17Nevertheless, comparisons remain interesting in order to have 
a deeper knowledge of not only similar institutions, but different situations resolved 
with similar methods of solutions and to understand the reasons of their different 
development. In addition, comparisons may help forecasting the impact of possible 
constitutional reforms on the development of a particular autonomous system. Finally, 
comparisons with Autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir are particularly interesting in the 
present stage of conflict resolution. 
Comparisons may be made on different grounds. To start with, a first comparison 
could take into account the constitutional basis of autonomy. In this respect, the kind 
and level of entrenchment would make the difference, together with the procedure 
according to which the devolution is carried out. As far as this criterion is concerned, 
Like Aland Islands Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed special status under Article 370 in 
Indian constitution vis-a-vis legislative, administrative and financial matters. Aland 
autonomy operate in a Unitarian Finish state while as Kashmir enjoying special status 
in a state to which K.C. Wheare, says quasi federal state. Apart from the formal basis 
of autonomy and its level of entrenchment, other similarities and differences can be 
found between the autonomy of Aland and that of Kashmir.
International organization like the League of Nations undertook to oversee the 
enforcement of the guarantees provided by the “Aland Agreement” makes the Aland’s 
case different from Kashmir. Still, as far as the domestic legal system is concerned, 
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stating that the autonomy of Aland is founded on International Law seems slightly 
excessive. In this respect, it is also essential to recall the enhancement of legal 
protection provided by the Finnish Constitutional system holds key.
A further comparison could be drawn in relation to the contents of autonomy, 
particularly in relation to the powers granted to the autonomous units. In this respect, 
on the grounds that all these autonomous communities enjoy legislative powers .The 
Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Orders promulgated by the 
President of India in 1954, and subsequently, have brought the State within the ambit 
of the legislative relations between the Union and the States envisaged by the 
Constitution of India. However, the exceptions and reservations, specifically with 
regard to the residuary powers, leave a wide field of legislative authority to the Jammu 
and Kashmir State. Residuary powers are a vital part of the legislative competence, 
which in the Indian federal organization, are vested with the Union Government. The 
elaborate enumeration of the powers, the Seventh Schedule underlines, adds to the 
importance of the residuary powers, mainly because any such enumeration can be far 
from exhaustive and the State Government has the opportunity to block a national 
decision on important matters of government, which may arise from time to time. In 
such a case, the Jammu and Kashmir State retains the initiative to legislate on matters, 
which may conflict with national consensus and force the Parliament to amend Article 
370, since the State Government would not be prepared to give concurrence to a 
change in the operation of Article 370, which the President of India would seek to 
bring about.
Aland’s autonomy seems much closer to the American type, which is usually 
referred to as federalism. Indeed, broad as it may be, Aland’s autonomy is enshrined 
in a constitutional text. In this respect – set aside the need to have the amendment 
approved by the Provincial Legislative Assembly, it remains fixed for as long as the 
complicated mechanisms for the amendments of the Constitutional texts have not been 
accomplished. Moreover, although Finland has no system of judicial review, 
compliance with the constitutional system of distribution of authority is ensured by 
juridical or quasi-judicial mechanisms, like the veto right of the President of the 
Republic on Aland’s legislation. In fact, the President may apply his veto only on 
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juridical grounds, when Aland’s legislation acts ultra vires, after having heard the 
opinion of the Supreme Court. Moreover, a fully juridical model applies to the 
supervision of state legislation in relations to Aland’s autonomy, since it is for the 
courts to decide whether or not a State Act should apply to Alandic matters.
The constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (under sec 144) provided a separate 
flag of the state which is a very significant exception in the whole Indian union. This 
feature is identical with Aland Islands. Aland has its own flag, has issued its own 
postage stamps since 1984, runs its own police force, and is a member of the Nordic 
Council. Since 2005 the Aland Islands also have had their own airline, Air Aland. The 
islands are demilitarized, and the population is exempt from conscription. Although 
Aland's autonomy preceded the creation of the regions of Finland, the autonomous 
government of Aland also has responsibility for the functions undertaken by Finland's 
regional councils. Aland is a member of the Small European Postal Administration 
Cooperation.
Citizenship
Generally, in a federal setup a person is a citizen not only of the state in which 
he resides but also of the federation, and both the federal and State  governments, each 
independent of the others, operating direct upon the citizen who is thus subject to the 
two governments and owe allegiance to both, but the Indian Constitution like 
Canadian, does not introduce any dual citizenship, only one citizenship i.e., the 
citizenship of India (Article 5), while as birth or residence in a particular state does not 
confer any separate citizenship. Here an important but controversial exception has 
been made through the constitution of India for the permanent residents of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir grants dual citizenship to its permanent 
residents. Every person who is, or is deemed to be, a citizen of India shall be 
permanent resident of the State. If on the 14 May 1954 he was a State subject of class 
I and class II, or, having lawfully acquired immovable property in the State, he has 
been ordinarily resident in the State for not less than 10 Years prior to that date. Any 
person who before the fourteenth day of May, 1954, was a State subject of class I or 
class II and who, having migrated after the first day of March 1947, to the territory 
now included in Pakistan, returns to the State under permit for the resettlement in the 
80
State or for permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law made by the 
State Legislature will on such return be a permanent resident of the State. The 
permanent residents will have all rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution of 
India.
As for as Aland Islands is concerned, People from Aland have joint regional 
(Aland) and national (Finnish) citizenship. People with Alandic citizenship 
(hembygdsrätt) have the right to buy property and set up a business on Aland, but 
Finns without regional citizenship cannot. Finns can get Alandic citizenship after 
living on the islands for five years, and Alanders lose their regional citizenship after 
living on the Finnish mainland for five years.18
Headship of the Regions
Under the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, there was a difference in the 
nomenclature for the head of the state. In the rest of India, the head of the state 
executive is called “Governor” and he is appointed by the President (under Arts.152 
and 155), while as in the state of Jammu and Kashmir the Executive head of the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir was called Sadar-i-Riyasat and he was to be elected by the 
State Legislative Assembly. This anomaly has, however, been removed by the 
Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir under 6th Amendment Act, 1965, as result of 
which the nomenclature has been changed from Sardar-i-Riyasat to Governor and he 
is to be appointed like any other Indian state by the President of India. With the result, 
there is no difference on this point, between Jammu and Kashmir and other states. On 
the other hand the position of Provincial Governor of Aland is one of the special 
features of the relationship between the province and the State of Finland. The 
Governor represents the State in Aland, but only a person accepted by the Alanders 
themselves can become Governor. He or she is appointed by agreement between the 
President of Finland and the Speaker of the Aland Parliament.
Languages and Culture
The official language of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is Urdu different 
from Indian Union where it is Hindi and English. But English will, unless the 
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legislatures by Law or otherwise provides, continue to be used for all official purposes 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Sec.145).As for as Aland Islands is concerned 
besides legislative and administrative institutions of its own, which are elements of 
autonomy, Aland also has concrete rules aimed at preserving the Swedish language 
and the local culture and customs. When the League of Nations had resolved the 
question of Aland in 1921, a set of rules was established in order to preserve this 
heritage. Special requirements were laid down concerning mainly the language, land 
ownership, the right to exercise a trade and the right to vote. Aland is a monolingual 
Swedish-speaking province, which means that Swedish is the official language of the 
province and its municipalities and the State too uses Swedish as its official language 
in Aland.  All documents addressed by State authorities to Aland have to be written in 
Swedish. Swedish is the language of instruction in all Alandic schools. The Alanders 
are active in defending their monolingualism, and an Alandic identity can be said to 
exist separately from the Finnish identity. As for as socio-religious life of Aland
Islands is concerned the vast majority of the population i.e., 94.8 percent belongs to 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Most inhabitants have Swedish (the sole official 
language) as their first language accounting to 90.2 percent and only 5.0 percent speak 
Finnish. It is thus evident that Aland is a homogenous province of Finland.19
On the other hand Jammu and Kashmir is a multi-lingual and multi-religious 
state and each group has its own distinct and peculiar cultural ethos further deepened 
by geographical divisions created by formidable mountain ranges. The Jammu region 
is dominantly Hindu with Muslims being in the majority in certain areas. The Kashmir 
Valley presents a heterogeneous population with two broad divisions i.e., Muslims 
and Kashmiri Pandits, both of whom speak Kashmiri, The people of Ladakh are 
believed to be descendants of a blended race of the Mons of North India, the Dards of 
Baltistan and the Mongols of Central Asia. Majority of the population is Buddhist. 
This heterogeneity has given rise to several political alignments along linguistic, 
regional andreligious lines which has also made Kashmir issue an internally complex 
affair to deal with. 
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Procedure for Amending the Constitution.
The Jammu and Kashmir  State Constitution may be amended by introducing 
a Bill in the legislative Assembly and getting it passed in each house by a majority of 
not less than two-third of the total membership of that House. But no Bill or 
amendment seeking to make any change in the provision relating to the relationship of 
the State with Union of India (Sec.3). The extent of the executive and legislative 
powers of the State (Sec.5) or the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable 
in relation to the State shall be introduced or moved in either House of the Legislature 
(Sec.147.2 Proviso).Same is the case with Aland Islands autonomy which has a very 
strong constitutional protection. The Act on the Autonomy of Aland may be amended 
only by the Parliament of Finland as provided for the amendment and repeal of the 
Constitution, and by a decision of the Aland Parliament. One of the major differences 
between Aland Islands and Kashmir Autonomy is an institution of Aland delegation. 
Aland Delegation is an institution for mediation which is proving supportive in 
resolving any sort of conflict or difference between Aland Islands and Finland. In case 
of Kashmir this kind of Institution is missing. Another institutional difference 
between Aland Islands and Jammu and Kashmir State lies in the independence of 
local politics from the central political parties. Indeed, the development and even the 
survival of a strong autonomy is extremely unlikely if local politics and political 
parties are not independent from the ones which lead the state policy. As a matter of 
fact, this element represents a big difference between Aland’s autonomy and that of 
the Jammu and Kashmir .In case of Kashmir major national political parties has not 
only their presence but they also play prominent role in government formation that too 
in the era of coalition governments.
Erosion and Evolution of autonomies
On the promulgation of the constitution on 26 January1950, It became clear 
that only two of its Articles, viz. Article1, which declared Jammu and Kashmir to be 
the part of Indian union, and Article 370, which defined the special status granted to 
the state, became applicable to Kashmir. While framing the constitution, incorporation 
of Article 370 was not an easy task from very beginning of Indian state in 1947. 
Political forces did not favour a truly federal state to emerge in India in the 
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background of partition. In this context provision of article 370 provided a different 
model and it limited the accession to only three items in relation to Kashmir. But there 
were some integrationist element in centre that look nation building project from more 
centralized and integrationist perspective. That is why from the very beginning of the 
constitutional operation a number of forces in India get activated against the retention 
of article 370. The assimilationist arguments and their practice has been perceived and 
experienced as betrayal in Kashmir. The eventual erosion of the special position that 
Kashmir had secured further intensified their sense of betrayal. The pressure for the 
erosion started shortly after the adoption of the Indian constitution in1950. As a result 
of this, the cordiality between the governments headed by Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah and Pandit Nehru was replaced with anger, Open bitterness and frustration 
Vis-a Vis each other. The political events of 1953, that led to the dismissal of Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah, The most potant advocates of state's autonomy starting casting 
their shadow on state's special position.20 This facilitated the process of greater merger 
of the state within the Indian union beginning with the presidential order 1954. In 
1965 union government got several amendments passed in state assembly; the 
nomenclature of Sadr-i-Riyasat was replaced by a governor, a political nominee 
appointed by the centre, the title of head of the government was changed from prime 
minister to chief minister, which was the regular title of heads of government within 
the Indian union, state representative to the lower house (Lok Shaba) of Indian 
parliament would no longer be nominated by state legislature but would be elected. 
These amendments were highly centrist and were designed to erode the autonomy of 
Jammu and Kashmir State provided by Article 370. This Perspective has lead to 
gradual erosion of autonomy and has been one of the contributing factors for 
alienation in Kashmir which resulted in violent armed movement in 1990’s. With the 
emergence of violence and rise of separatist sentiments the conflict in Kashmir 
consumes a lot of human, economic, social and psychological resources.
Now considering the Aland Islands, it is apparent that more than nine decades 
of Aland’s autonomous life have not been static. The status has evolved over time, in 
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response to arising needs and changing times. After thirty years of autonomy 
governed by the Agreements of 1921. The autonomy of Aland has been expanded 
through two major revisions to the autonomy act in 1951 and in 1991.  The first 
revision was initiated after the Second World War, when a new generation of 
politicians came to power. A regional movement also developed in Aland during the 
years 1950-1975.  National symbols (the Aland flag, stamps and a national museum) 
were created.  The 1951 Autonomy Act introduced the specific right of domicile or 
regional citizenship, although elements of it already existed in the previous act.  In the 
Autonomy Act of 16 August 1991, which entered into force on 1 January 1993, 
satisfactory knowledge of Swedish as a requirement for regional citizenship was 
added.  The other aims of the 1991 revision, enacted with the mutual consent of both 
the Finnish government and the Aland legislative assembly, was to define more 
clearly the legislative competencies of the state and of the provincial authorities to 
transfer additional areas of competence to Aland and to provide for the later transfer 
of increased authority in other areas and to expand autonomy in the economic 
sphere.21
Conduct of foreign affairs 
In Aland Islands as per present domestic distribution of competence between 
the State and the Provincial authorities – military matters and foreign relations (still) 
fall within the complete domain of the State. This does not mean, however, that the 
Alanders have no say in military matters, as far as these Islands are concerned, as a 
matter of fact any democratic system, which supports local autonomy, must somehow 
afford the local communities the opportunity to manifest their will.  Thus, even if the 
provincial authorities lack the power to decide similar matters alone, they have the 
possibility to influence the decisions of the competent bodies. Indeed, the democratic 
principle implies that all local authorities, which represent the people, may pursue a 
generality of aims, according to the institutional chances provided to them. As far as 
matters in which the Alanders have an actual interest are concerned, several 
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institutional mechanisms may be used in order to influence the State decision-making 
process also in the fields of the external security and foreign relations. In this respect, 
the main resources in Aland’s hands are.22
a) The right of the Legislative Assembly to “submit initiatives on matters within 
the legislative power of the State which the Government of Finland shall 
present for consideration of the Finnish Parliament” 
b) The similar right of the Government of Aland to submit initiatives on matters 
within the competence of the State “for the issuance of administrative 
provisions and regulations for Aland” 
c) The right of the Government of Aland to be heard “before the enactment of an 
Act of special importance to Aland” 
d) The right of the Government of Aland to “propose negotiations on a treaty with 
a foreign State to the appropriate State officials”
e) The possibility to take initiatives and influence the decision-making in the 
Finnish Parliament through the representative elected in the Aland
constituency. 
f) The general right of the Legislative Assembly, in its capacity as the legal  
representative of the people of Aland in matters related to its autonomy, to 
express the will of the people in all of these matters. Indeed, according to the 
Report of the Government on the Government Proposal to Parliament for a new 
Act on the Autonomy of Aland, it is the duty of the Legislative Assembly to 
express the will of the people in matters relating to autonomy. The duty is 
performed by using the right of the Legislative Assembly to make decisions, 
submit motions and express opinions, as referred to various provisions of the 
Autonomy Act. In connection with autonomy it may become necessary to 
address issues that do not directly relate to the autonomy matters referred to in 
the Autonomy Act, but rather to the bases of autonomy or the sphere of Aland
authority. The Legislative Assembly represents Aland in these situations.
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Should it be concluded that these mechanisms are too weak in so far as the 
actual power to decide the matter does not fall into Aland’s hands? It does not hold 
true, mostly in the light of the fact that Finland has based its relations with its 
autonomous Province on the principle of consensus.23 In such a situation, similar 
“weak mechanisms” can result much stronger than one could believe after a prima 
facie evaluation. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Aland authorities and the 
Finnish Ministry of Defence have “agreed that the Governor of Aland (who represents 
the Finnish Government) will be informed about each visit of Finnish warships in 
advance, and he in turn will pass on the information to the Aland authorities”.24
The situation has been totally different in case of Jammu and Kashmir, On 26 
October 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Dominion of India 
when its ruler Maharaja Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession and the 
Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten accepted the instrument. With this 
Maharaja made accession of his state, Jammu and Kashmir, to India. This was the 
time when thousands of tribal groups had raided the State. By the Instrument of 
Accession, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir accepted three subjects on which the 
Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State. Indian Constituent Assembly in 
1949 adopted Article 370 of the Constitution, ensuring a special status and internal 
autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir with Indian jurisdiction in Kashmir limited to the 
three areas: defence, foreign affairs and communications. Kashmir and Aland Islands 
differ as for as ‘say in foreign affairs’ is concerned. In Indian case foreign affairs fall 
in jurisdiction of dominion power as has been accepted by state in instrument of 
accession while as anything which has its bearing in Aland autonomy is to acquire 
Aland island opinion. 
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Differences in Economic Setup
Jammu & Kashmir, being part of the Indian Himalayan Region,  has some 
unique economic disadvantages arising out of political history, remoteness and poor 
connectivity, hilly and often inhospitable terrain, vulnerability to natural disasters, a 
weak resource base, poor infrastructure, shallow markets and most importantly long 
standing conflict. Taken together, all these factors have resulted in low economic 
activity, low employment and low‐income generation. 
With the decolonization of Indian sub-continent accompanied by partition of 
the Indian subcontienetand conflict between the two succeeding states of India and 
Pakistan. The problem of the political arrangement of state of Jammu and Kashmir, 
which had close and intimate contacts with both of them, increased manifold, needless 
to say that the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is the bone of contention in 
their conflicts.25 At the time of independence of the Indian sub-continent, there were 
three highways linking the state with the outside world. They were Jhelum Valley 
Road from Srinagar to Kohala via Baramulla and Domel; Banihal Road from Srinagar 
to Sialkot via Banihal and Jammu and Abbotabad Road from Domel to Abbotabad via 
Ramkot. There was also a rail link from Jammu to Sialkot forming part of the pre-
partition N.W. Railway system. These highways were connecting the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir with Punjab which had become the part of Pakistan. The accession of 
Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian union and the subsequent declaration of Pakistan 
as an enemy country by the Nationalists who were in power in the state, all these 
highways and waterways became entirely useless for the people of the state.26 The 
age-old economic ties of the people living in the state, particularly on its borders, with 
those living on the other side of the frontiers had been cut- off, thereby shattering the 
entire economic structure which was so laboriously and diligently built through 
centuries.27The conflict between India and Pakistan besides blocking the historical 
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routes of the state and splitting its territory, also led to the imposition of restrictions on 
other activities which had long term impact on state’s economy. Percapita income of 
Jammu Kashmir is Rs 24,214which is quite low as compared to the national average 
of 33,283. According to the latest comparable data, Jammu Kashmir is ranked at the 
21st position in terms of per capita income among all the Indian states.28
The Jammu and Kashmir economy depends mostly on traditional forms of occ
upation.  The economy of Jammu and Kashmir is an undeveloped one. Unaffected and
unaltered by modern day industrial developments and changing times because of 
the reason that the state   is affected by continued violence, insurgency and 
uncertainty. In a recent survey conducted by United Kingdom based Chatam House, 
their report says, 96 percent of respondents from Kashmir Valley identified 
unemployment as one of the main problems facing J&K, along with conflict and 
corruption.29With the number of registered unemployed youth crossing 6 lakh, Jammu 
and Kashmir has the highest unemployment rate of 5.3 percent in comparison to its 
four neighbouring states. The number of unemployed youth registered in various 
District Employment and Counselling Canters is 6.01 lakes ending   till September 
2011, Economic Survey for the financial year 2011-12 has revealed.30 As for as state’s 
financial viability is concerned, Political conflict has impaired the state's ability to 
raise financial resources to have a stable economical growth. Presently the state's debt 
accumulation is serious. States debt-to-gross state domestic product (GSDP) ratio rose 
to 75.03 per cent in 2010 - up from 69.78 per cent in 2008-09. That is a recipe for 
disaster. The Reserve Bank of India report says that among all the states in India, 
J&K’s debt-to-GSDP ratio was the highest in 2008-09 - except for the four tiny states 
of Mizoram, Sikkim, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh.
Now focussing on the economic setup in Aland Islands, It need to be 
underlined thatAland is a small society with an open economy that is dependent on 
trade with neighbouring regions. The Islands' location midway between two 
expanding economic centres, southern Finland and the Stockholm region, is a major 
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advantage, but also makes Aland sensitive to economic fluctuations in its two 
neighbouring markets. Aland's economy is heavily dominated by shipping, trade and 
tourism. Shipping represents about 40percentof the economy, with several 
international carriers owned and operated from Aland. Most companies apart from 
shipping are small, with fewer than ten employees. Farming and fishing are important 
in combination with the food industry. A few high-profile technology companies 
contribute to a prosperous economy. Wind power is rapidly developing, aiming at 
reversing the direction in the cables to the mainland in coming years. In December 
2011 wind power accounted for 31.48 percent of Aland's total electricity usage. The 
abolition of tax-free sales on ferry boats travelling between destinations within the 
European Union made Finland demand an exception for the Aland Islands on EU's 
VAT rules. The exception allows for maintained tax-free sales on the ferries between 
Sweden and Finland (provided they stop at Mariehamn or Langnas) and at the airport, 
but has also made Aland a different tax-zone, meaning  that tariffs must be levied on 
goods brought to the islands .Unemployment is well below than that of surrounding 
regions, 1.8 percent in 2004.The Finnish State collects taxes, duties and fees also in 
Aland. In return, the Finnish Government places a sum of money at the disposal of the 
Aland Parliament. The sum is 0.45 percent of total Government income, excluding 
Government loans. In 2006, the sum was about€ 182 million.According to Eurostat, in 
2006 Aland was the 20th wealthiest of the EU's 268 regions, and the wealthiest in 
Finland, with a GDP per inhabitant 47 percent above the EU mean. Aland enjoys the 
largest state subsidies of any Finnish region (maakunta/landskap), totalling annually 
about 4,000 EUR per inhabitant more than the Alanders pay in state taxes (2006 
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